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Introduction	
	
International	negotiations	and	their	outcomes	are	an	expression	of	international	relations.		
Likewise,	debates	in	International	Negotiation	(IN)	theory	reflect	debates	in	International	
Relations	(IR)	theory.	Depending	on	one’s	fundamental	beliefs,	negotiators	ultimately	
attempt	to	maximize	utility	(realism),	construct	regimes	(neoliberalism)	or	establish	norms	
and	principles	(constructivism).	The	question	is	whether	it	might	not	be	wise	for	those	
studying	international	negotiations	to	carve	their	own	path.		
	
Even	the	IR	theorists	themselves	find	it	problematic	to	adhere	strictly	to	a	single,	rigid	
system	of	beliefs.	Stretched	to	their	extremes,	they	tend	to	produce	uncomfortable	and	
awkward	results	–	ending	in	circles	or	paradoxes.		
	
The	constructivist	might	argue	that	international	relations	are	socially	and	historically	
constructed,	but	they	are	confronted	with	consistent	conflict	–	as	if	governed	by	natural	
law.	Similarly,	neoliberalists	may	find	that	their	philosophy	of	complex	interdependence	can	
lead	to	gains	for	all,	but	they	are	also	confronted	with	its	limits	in	light	of	recent	political	
developments.	Finally,	the	realists,	with	their	focus	on	the	hard	power	of	money	and	
weapons,	have	difficulties	explaining	the	consistent	success	of	weaklings;	of	David	versus	
Goliath.		
	
This	last	problem	inspires	the	current	research.	The	paradox	that	structural	realist	thinking	
produces	is	especially	interesting	to	IN	theorists.	It	is	known	in	IN	theory	as	the	
structuralists’	paradox,	after	the	stream	of	realism	which	fails	to	solve	it.1	It	asks	how	it	can	
be	that	weak	parties	negotiate	with	strong	parties,	and	still	gain	something.		
	
The	paradox	is	not	resolved	with	a	simple	move	to	another	ideology.	To	say	that	power	
relations	in	negotiations	are	socially	constructed	does	not	explain	differences	in	hard	power,	
nor	does	it	clarify	the	issue	of	weak	parties’	success.	Similarly,	though	institutionalisation	(as	
																																																						
1	I.W.	Zartman	(2008),	The	Structuralists’	Paradox	in	Negotiation.	In:	I.W.	Zartman	(2008),	
Negotiation	and	Conflict	Management,	Essays	on	Theory	and	Practice.	Routledge,	New	York.	p.	100	
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envisaged	by	the	neoliberalists)	may	have	significant	influence	over	today’s	process	of	
international	negotiation,	it	does	not	fully	explain	outcomes.	At	best,	it	expresses	a	desired	
outcome	–	namely	mutually	beneficial	agreements.		
	
It	is	therefore	not	by	looking	back	at	traditional	IR	theory	that	the	IN	theorists	were	able	to	
resolve	the	paradox;	it	was	by	developing	their	own.	What	helps	IN	theorists	is	their	
proximity	to	practice.	Most	IR	theory	attempts	to	explain	grand	events	and	power	shifts	that	
take	place	over	decades,	if	not	centuries.	By	contrast,	IN	theory	can	profit	from	the	study	of	
a	near	infinite	list	of	negotiations	taking	place	every	day.	The	structuralists’	paradox	
emerges	from	observing	‘weak’	parties	gain	against	‘strong’	parties,	and	it	is	resolved	by	
observing	patterns	in	the	manifestations	of	that	paradox.	Through	these	observations,	it	
becomes	clear	that	perceived	‘weak’	parties	have	strengths	of	their	own	that	allow	them	to	
level	the	playing	field	in	negotiations	–	that	the	label	of	‘weak’	may	be	misleading.		
	
This	finding	informs	IR	theory	in	their	attempt	to	understand	the	influence	of	smaller	states.	
It	can	be	said,	then,	that	IN	theory	is	inspired,	but	not	determined	by	traditional	IR	streams.	
The	interaction	between	both	fields	is	very	much	a	two-way	street,	whereby	a	problem	is	
sent	one	way,	and	a	solution	is	sent	the	other.	This	interaction	is	particularly	inspiring	in	the	
field	of	humanitarian	action.		
	
Humanitarian	organisations	are	not	traditionally	accounted	for	in	international	relations,	
though	their	role	appears	to	be	increasingly	influential.	Whilst	IR	theory	focuses	on	states	
and	intergovernmental	organisations	(IGOs)	as	the	two	major	players	in	the	international	
political	arena,	it	cannot	be	ignored	that	humanitarian	non-governmental	organisations	
(HNGOs)	are	directly	and	indirectly	exerting	influence	over	international	policy.	One	
example	is	their	increasing	involvement	in	the	creation	of	policy	within	the	world’s	largest	
IGO:	The	United	Nations	(UN).	The	IR	theorist	might	ask	to	what	extent	HNGOs	(and	NGOs	in	
general)	are	becoming	a	third	major	player	in	the	international	political	arena.		
	
To	IN	theorists,	HNGOs	are	particularly	interesting	because	of	their	negotiations	over	
humanitarian	access.	These	negotiations	represent	a	very	particular	manifestation	of	the	
structuralists’	paradox,	as	unarmed	HNGOs	negotiate	with	armed	state	and	non-state	actors	
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on	their	territory,	often	with	some	degree	of	success.	The	study	of	these	negotiations	can	
potentially	serve	as	a	test	of	the	concept	of	power	(of	‘weak’	and	‘strong’)	as	well	as	the	
changing	status	of	(H)NGOs	in	the	international	arena.	As	such,	through	the	application	and	
testing	of	IN	theory,	new	insights	can	be	given	back	to	IR.		
	
With	this	broader	goal	in	mind,	the	question	asked	in	this	thesis	is	how	perceived	weak	and	
unarmed	HNGOs	can	gain	leverage	in	negotiations	with	perceived	strong	and	armed	states,	
when	negotiating	over	humanitarian	access	to	a	conflict	zone.		
	
The	answer	to	this	question	will	be	a	context-specific	solution	to	the	structuralists’	paradox;	
that	context	being	humanitarian	negotiation.	As	such,	this	is	an	explorative	endeavour	
aiming	to	find	out	what	types	of	power	HNGOs	can	and	do	utilize	in	order	to	leverage	states	
into	giving	them	access.	Beyond	exploration,	the	findings	can	be	made	prescriptive.	The	
understanding	of	the	power	of	HNGOs	can	be	used	to	empower	future	negotiators,	as	it	
informs	HNGOs	where	and	how	they	ought	to	focus	their	resources	in	order	to	increase	
their	efficacy.		
	
This	thesis	will	be	divided	into	two	main	sections:	theory	building	and	theory	testing.	
Section	one	will	start	by	taking	a	look	at	HNGOs.	What	makes	them	unique,	and	why	are	
they	interesting	to	study?	This	will	be	the	start	of	the	theoretical	framework,	where	it	will	
also	be	shown	how	the	status	of	(H)NGOs	has	evolved	and	grown	since	the	founding	of	the	
UN,	in	what	ways	they	have	been	included	in	negotiations	and	how	they	have	been	
effective.	Subsequently,	the	concept	of	power	as	it	exists	today	in	IR	and	IN	theory	will	be	
discussed.	Together,	the	theory	on	HNGOs	and	power	will	be	used	to	formulate	a	theory	on	
the	power	of	HNGOs,	in	the	form	of	a	set	of	hypotheses.		
	
In	section	two,	this	theory	will	be	tested	using	process	tracing,	using	the	method	prescribed	
by	Beach	and	Pedersen.2	The	method	will	be	applied	to	a	single	case,	namely	that	of	the	
Médicins	Sans	Frontières’	negotiations	with	the	government	of	Sri	Lanka	in	the	period	of	
2005	until	2009,	the	peak	of	a	civil	war	between	that	government	and	the	Liberation	Tigers	
																																																						
2	D.	Beach,	R.	Pedersen	(2013).	Process-Tracing	Methods.	University	of	Michigan	Press,	Ann	Arbor.	
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of	Tamil	Elam	(LTTE).	Using	this	method,	it	will	be	shown	whether	or	not	the	hypotheses	on	
the	manifestations	of	HNGO	power	can	be	observed	in	a	real-life	case,	providing	a	solid	
foundation	for	further	cross-case	research.		
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Section	One	
Theoretical	Framework		
	
1.1 International	Negotiation	
	
In	his	all-encompassing	work	on	diplomatic	negotiations,	Paul	Meerts	defines	it	as	an	
‘exchange	of	concessions	and	compensations	in	a	framework	of	international	order	accepted	
by	sovereign	entities.’3		
	
This	definition	makes	statements	about	the	who,	where	and	the	how	of	diplomatic	
negotiation.	As	the	name	suggests,	it	is	reserved	for	diplomats	of	sovereign	nations.	In	the	
current	research,	the	subject	is	rather	the	broader	field	of	international	negotiations,	where	
public	and	private	parties	from	different	nations	meet.	The	‘where’	–	defined	by	Meerts	as	
the	‘framework	of	international	order’	–	is	less	defined	here	as	a	result.	Where	relations	
between	states	are	often	clearly	defined	and	organized	in	intergovernmental	organisations	
(IGOs)	and	international	forums,	the	relations	between	states	and	non-state	actors	are	not	
as	clear,	adding	an	extra	dimension	to	the	current	study.		
	
The	‘what’	remains	unchanged.	Negotiations	entail	the	exchange	of	concessions	and	
compensations	in	order	to	reach	an	agreement.	
	
The	question	of	‘when?’	is	answered	by	Zartman.	He	states	that	‘negotiation	takes	place	
when	neither	party	in	a	conflict	is	strong	enough	to	impose	its	will	or	to	resolve	the	conflict	
unilaterally.’4	This	inability	to	resolve	conflict	unilaterally	makes	clear	the	need	for	
concessions	and	compensations.	It	also	raises	many	questions.	The	fact	that	neither	party	
can	unilaterally	create	a	solution,	suggests	a	form	of	equality.	Since	neither	party	can	act	
alone,	each	party	has	a	veto.	At	the	same	time,	power	inequality	exists,	allowing	one	party	
																																																						
3	P.	Meerts	(2015),	Diplomatic	Negotiation,	Essence	and	Evolution.	Clingendael	Institute,	The	Hague.	
(p.	11)	
4	I.W.	Zartman	(1997),	Structuralist	Dilemma	in	Negotiation,	Research	Group	in	International	
Security.	(p.	1)	
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to	gain	more	than	the	other.	The	tension	between	this	symmetry	on	the	one	hand,	and	
asymmetry	on	the	other,	forms	the	structuralists’	paradox,	which	asks	how	weak	parties	can	
negotiate	with	strong	parties	and	still	gain	something.	This	will	be	the	subject	of	more	
discussion	later	on.		
	
The	victories	of	non-state	actors	in	negotiations	with	states,	which	will	be	seen	throughout	
this	thesis,	are	a	manifestation	of	this	paradox.	How	can	a	non-state	actor	gain	in	a	
negotiation	with	a	state,	despite	the	vast	differences	in	economic	and	military	resources?	
What	power	is	it	utilising	to	gain	concessions	from	a	seemingly	much	more	powerful	actor?		
	
The	wins	of	David	vs	Goliath,	suggests	that	differences	in	resources	seem	to	matter	less	
somehow	at	the	negotiation	table	than	they	would	on	a	battlefield,	and	that	there	are	other	
sources	of	power	at	play	which	non-state	actors	can	utilize	as	well	as,	if	not	better	than,	
states.	For	non-state	actors,	negotiations	are	therefore	a	powerful	tool	in	their	mission	to	
assert	their	interests	in	the	international	political	arena.	
	
In	this	thesis,	international	negotiation	will	be	explored	from	this	perspective,	namely	that	
negotiation	can	be	the	tool	of	the	weak.	
	
Moving	forward,	it	is	necessary	first	to	differentiate	HNGOs	from	other	parties	in	
international	negotiations.	After	that,	power	must	be	defined	in	a	way	that	is	able	to	explain	
how	such	a	party	is	able	to	negotiate	with	states	and	still	gain	something.		These	will	be	the	
subjects	of	the	following	sections.		
	
1.2	Differentiating	HNGOs		
	
Traditional	literature	on	the	subject	of	international	negotiation	is	state-centric.5	As	with	the	
broader	subject	of	International	Relations	(IR),	states	are	seen	to	have	most	influence	when	
it	comes	to	deciding	the	outcome	of	inter-	and	intrastate	conflict,	and	therefore	they	are	
																																																						
5	D.	Lake	(2008).	The	State	and	International	Relations.	In:	Oxford	Handbook	of	International	
Relations,	edited	by	Christian	Reus-Smit	and	Duncan	Snidal,		
Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford.	(pp.	41	–	61)	
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chosen	as	the	main	unit	of	analysis.	This	choice	has	far-reaching	consequences	for	the	
content	of	international	negotiation	theory.	States	and	HNGOs	can	both	be	seen	as	as	self-
interested	stakeholders	attempting	to	maximize	their	own	profits	in	any	given	situation,	but	
they	each	have	unique	skills,	resources	and	interests	which	ultimately	decide	their	influence	
on	a	given	negotiation.		
	
These	unique	characteristics,	which	will	be	elaborated	on	below,	are	one	reason	HNGOs	are	
an	interesting	subject	for	research.	The	fact	that	they	are	successful	in	negotiations	despite	
the	fact	that	they	operate	outside	of	traditional	power	structures,	challenges	traditional	
ideas	on	power.	This	section	attempts	to	understand	what	makes	them	unique,	and	how	
they	relate	to	those	power	structures.		
	
Despite	their	lack	of	military	power,	non-state	actors	are	increasingly	involved	in	negotiating	
and	mediating	at	the	front	lines	of	conflict.	This	increase	in	the	involvement	of	non-state	
actors	appears	to	be	closely	related	to	the	post-cold	war	transition	from	so-called	old	to	
new	wars6,		which	typically	take	place	among	fragmented,	non-state	actors,	or	between	
those	actors	and	states.	
	
From	the	humanitarian	community’s	perspective,	this	shift	in	the	nature	of	international	
conflict	has	been	paired	with	a	decline	in	respect	for	international	law,	and	by	extension,	
humanitarian	actors.	The	community	has	observed	a	‘shrinking	humanitarian	space’	and	a	
blurring	of	the	line	between	military	and	humanitarian	action.7	In	practice,	this	means	that	
the	space	in	which	humanitarian	actors	can	act	safely	has	become	significantly	smaller	since	
the	turn	of	the	century.8	This	elicited	a	response	from	humanitarian	actors,	who	have	had	to	
change	their	modus	operandi	in	order	to	preserve	their	existence	as	aid	providers.		
	
The	blurring	of	the	line	between	military	and	humanitarian	action	has	forced	humanitarian	
organisations	to	become	increasingly	involved	in	the	security	and	political	aspects	of	
																																																						
6	M.	Kaldor	(1999),	New	and	Old	Wars:	Organised	Violence	in	a	Globalised	Era,	Polity	Press,	London.		
7	S.	Collinson,	S.	Elhawary	(2012),	Humanitarian	Space:	A	Review	of	Trends	and	Issues,	Humanitarian	
Policy	Group,	London.			
8	Collinson	and	Elhawary	take	the	events	of	September	11th,	2001	as	the	turning	point.		
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conflicts.	In	traditional	interstate	conflict,	the	humanitarian	space	was	designated	by	the	
conflict	parties,	or	otherwise	it	was	created	by	the	international	community	under	
international	law.	In	new	interstate	and	intrastate	conflict,	it	has	been	up	to	the	
humanitarian	organisations	themselves	to	negotiate	their	own	space	within	the	conflict	for	
them	to	be	able	to	bring	aid	to	those	in	need,	a	practice	which	has	become	known	as	
negotiating	access.	In	doing	so,	these	organisations	have	become	party	to	modern	conflicts	
in	a	unique	way.	They	bring	different	interests,	skills	and	resources	to	the	table.	They	
become	potential	mediators	between,	but	they	also	negotiate	directly	with	state	and	non-
state	combatant	groups.	In	short,	they	become	negotiators	and	mediators	in	a	conflict	that	
is	not	their	own.		
	
It	is	exactly	because	their	position	differs	so	fundamentally	from	those	of	states,	that	a	
unique	study	is	required	to	understand	how	these	actors	function	as	negotiators	and	
mediators,	or	in	short,	as	influencers	of	conflict.		
	
Therefore,	the	next	question	that	must	be	answered	in	order	to	answer	the	research	
question	is:	what	distinguishes	these	non-state	humanitarian	actors	from	the	state	actors,	
as	well	as	other	non-state	actors	that	are	involved	in	international	conflicts?	
	
Types	of	Non-State	Actors	
	
There	are	many	types	of	non-state	actors.	Multinational	corporations	are	a	non-state	actor	
which	might	influence	conflict,	whether	it	be	through	lobbying	or	the	sale	of	a	specific	
product	(eg.	weaponry).	Religious	groups	can	also	be	part	of	a	conflict,	either	because	they	
partake	in	violence	(such	as	ISIS,	which	claims	to	act	in	the	name	of	Islam),	or	as	a	mediator	
of	conflict.	Quakers	have	been	known	to	mediate	conflict,	also	by	founding	organisations	
like	Amnesty	International,	Greenpeace	and	OXFAM.	The	type	of	non-state	actors	that	will	
be	discussed	here	are	non-governmental	organisations	(NGOs).		
	
NGOs	
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NGOs	are	a	diverse	set	of	organisations	that	make	the	term	difficult	to	define.	However,	
there	are	some	key	characteristics	which	separate	NGOs	from	other	organisations,	and	
which	will	be	relevant	for	the	purpose	of	this	research.	The	UN	captures	these	as	follows:		
	
“A	non-governmental	organization	(NGO)	is	any	non-profit,	voluntary	citizens’	group	which	
is	organized	on	a	local,	national	or	international	level.”9	
	
The	key	term	here	are	non-profit	and	voluntary.	An	additional	attribute	which	is	often	given	
to	NGOs	is	that	they	are	independent	from	states.	However,	this	is	a	problematic	statement.	
In	principle,	NGOs	should	always	operate	independently,	but	many	cannot	be	said	to	be	
wholly	independent,	since	they	receive	funding	from	one	or	more	governments.	Some	will	
therefore	maintain	that	NGOs	are	not	independent,	but	that	they	operate	independently	in	
the	sense	that	they	do	not	have	to	ask	for	permission	from	those	governments	to	act	one	
way	or	another.	However,	since	it	is	likely	that	an	NGO	will	lose	its	funding	if	it	
systematically	acts	against	the	interests	of	the	government	it	is	funded	by,	in	practice	it	
cannot	be	said	that	all	NGOs	operate	independently	of	states.	This	attribute	can	only	be	
given	to	those	NGOs	which	are	not	state-funded.		
	
NGOs	operate	on	the	local,	national	and	international	level,	and	can	have	many	different	
goals.	They	typically	aim	at	some	kind	of	social	improvement,	through	involvement	in	
environmental,	political,	humanitarian	or	development	policy	and	action.	The	current	
investigation	focuses	on	NGOs	that	act	on	the	international	level	and	that	have	
humanitarian	interests.		
	
International	Humanitarian	Interests	
	
States	are	self-interested.	They	engage	in	international	relations	in	order	to	promote	their	
own	economic,	security	and	political	interests.	NGOs	presumably	also	want	to	promote	their	
own	interests,	but	those	interests	are	fundamentally	different	from	those	of	states.		
	
																																																						
9	https://outreach.un.org/ngorelations/content/about-us-0		
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Even	humanitarian	NGOs	(From	here	on:	HNGOs)	do	not	all	have	the	same	interests.	It	is	
true	that	interests	are	similar	for	most,	but	they	also	show	remarkable	differences.	
Médecins	Sans	Frontières	(MSF)	is	interested	in	providing	medical	assistance	to	victims	of	
natural	and	man-made	disasters,	and	to	the	victims	of	armed	conflict.	They	emphasize	that	
they	do	so	regardless	of	race,	religion,	creed	or	political	convictions.10	The	Centre	for	
Humanitarian	Dialogue	(CHD),	in	its	mission,	simply	states	that	it	aims	to	‘prevent,	mitigate	
and	resolve	armed	conflicts	through	dialogue	and	mediation.’11	The	International	
Committee	of	the	Red	Cross	takes	a	broader	approach,	aiming	to	promote	international	
humanitarian	law	and	the	Geneva	Convention,	by	supplying	medical	and	other	humanitarian	
aid	directly	in	response	to	conflict,	but	also	by	providing	economic	assistance,	engaging	in	
lobbying	and	diplomacy,	and	creating	campaigns	for	specific	issues	such	as	sexual	violence.12		
	
MSF,	CHD	and	ICRC	all	exist	within	the	realm	of	HNGOs.	In	many	ways,	they	can	be	said	to	
have	the	same	humanitarian	interests,	but	they	translate	those	interests	into	very	different	
mandates.	This	is	important	to	note,	because	it	influences	how	they	approach	a	conflict	
zone	and	what	level	of	freedom	they	have	when	they	decide	to	become	party	to	a	conflict.	
It	also	points	to	another	significant	difference:	the	constituency.		
	
Membership,	Constituency	&	Mandate	
	
A	(democratic)	government	which	wants	to	become	party	to	an	external	conflict	must	do	so	
by	the	grace	of	its	people:	its	constituency.	Consent	is	often	implicit	(through	lack	of	
protest)	rather	than	explicit	(through	voting),	but	a	state	is	most	definitely	constrained	by	its	
constituency	with	regard	to	the	conflicts	it	can	enter.	By	contrast,	HNGOs	rarely	have	
democratic	mechanisms	(such	as	voting)	which	can	prevent	its	missions.	It	is,	of	course,	
possible	for	them	to	lose	funding,	but	since	HNGOs	often	have	a	clear	mission	on	which	they	
act,	it	is	unlikely	for	financiers	to	be	surprised	by	the	actions	they	decide	to	take.	To	put	it	
simply,	MSF	has	the	mission	to	provide	medical	aid	and	attracts	funding	on	a	voluntary	
basis.	It	is	therefore	unlikely	that	the	interests	of	MSF	will	stop	aligning	with	those	of	their	
																																																						
10	http://www.msf.org/en/msf-charter-and-principles		
11	https://www.hdcentre.org/		
12	https://www.icrc.org/en/who-we-are/mandate		
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funders,	unless	it	decides	to	make	a	drastic	change	to	their	overall	mission.	The	fact	that	
MSF	does	not	have	traditional	members,	but	only	donators,	ensures	homogeneous	backing	
for	its	actions.					
	
This	stands	opposite	to	the	type	of	constraints	that	are	experienced	by	the	UN.	Much	of	the	
UN’s	mandate,	stated	in	the	UN	Charter,	has	a	humanitarian	hallmark.	However,	the	UN	has	
members	who	can	block	its	efforts	to	execute	that	mandate.	The	veto	right,	which	is	all	too	
often	exercised	by	one	of	the	permanent	members	of	the	UN	Security	Council	(UNSC),	is	a	
prime	example	of	this	constraint.	The	fact	that	the	UN	depends	both	on	funding	and	
consent	from	a	heterogeneous	membership,	limits	the	UN	in	its	ability	to	execute	its	
mandate.	
	
Lack	of	membership	and	a	homogeneous	backing	give	the	HNGO	relative	freedom	to	
execute	its	mandate,	compared	to	states	and	intergovernmental	organisations	(IGOs)	like	
the	UN.	On	the	other	hand,	the	lack	of	a	constituency	and	(democratic)	representation	
raises	questions	about	accountability,	as	well	as	their	role	in	negotiations	in	general.	Parties	
to	a	negotiation	justify	their	presence	at	the	table	because	they	represent	a	group	of	people	
who	are	stakeholders	to	a	conflict.	HNGOs	must	seek	this	justification	elsewhere,	as	will	be	
addressed	later.	
	
The	fact	remains	that	HNGOs	are	relatively	unrestricted,	due	to	the	nature	of	their	mandate.	
However,	in	other	areas	they	are	much	more	limited	than	states.		
	
(Financial)	Resources		
	
States	and	IGOs	generally	have	more	resources	than	HNGOs.	In	2015,	the	MSF	and	ICRC	
(two	of	world’s	largest	NGOs)	had	expenditures	of	approximately	1	and	1.4	billion	euros	
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respectively.13	Smaller	NGOs	like	CHD	have	a	budget	of	approximately	50	million	euros	
annually.14		
	
State	involvement	in	the	same	conflicts	utilizes	their	defence	budgets.	A	small	nation	like	
the	Netherlands	has	a	defence	budget	exceeding	8	billion	dollars,	more	than	five	times	the	
budget	of	the	largest	HNGO.15	The	US	military,	whom	HNGOs	often	encounter	on	their	
missions,	has	a	budget	of	approximately	600	billion	dollars.16	Even	the	US	main	outlet	for	
humanitarian	spending,	USAID,	has	a	budget	that	is	approximately	twenty	times	larger	than	
that	of	the	MSF,	at	22.7	billion	dollars.17		
	
This	shows	that	the	financial	resources	available	to	states	(and	by	extension,	IGOs),	dwarf	
the	funding	that	HNGOs	can	utilize.	Therefore,	whilst	states	and	IGOs	may	be	somewhat	
limited	by	their	constituency	and	membership,	HNGOs	are	severely	limited	by	their	
finances.		
	
In	addition	to	(and	as	a	result	of)	this	lack	of	financial	resources,	HNGOs	deal	with	a	constant	
lack	of	staff	and	materials	that	are	necessary	to	fulfil	its	missions.	Despite	its	presence	in	
South	Sudan,	the	MSF	and	other	HNGOs	are	not	able	to	prevent	a	humanitarian	crisis,	for	a	
large	part	because	they	lack	the	resources	to	deal	with	the	vast	number	of	victims	in	the	
region.		
	
Another	resource	that	HNGOs	lack	is	weaponry.	This	is,	of	course,	not	only	due	to	a	lack	of	
resources,	but	because	their	mandate	and	their	principles	do	not	allow	them	to	carry	them.	
Whilst	organisations	like	the	UN	appear	everywhere	in	armoured	vehicles	in	order	to	carry	
out	its	humanitarian	mission,	MSF	staff	appear	as	civilians.	As	a	result,	the	HNGOs	depend	
largely	on	others	to	ensure	their	safety.			
																																																						
13	ICRC	Annual	Report	(2015):	https://www.icrc.org/en/document/annual-report-2015-icrc		
MSF	Financial	Report	(2015):	https://www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/msf_finance_summary_2015-
1.pdf		
14	http://www.gpplatform.ch/pbguide/organisation/centre-humanitarian-dialogue		
15	Dutch	Ministry	of	Defense	(2016),	Kerngegevens	Defensie:	Feiten	en	Cijfers.	Found	at:	
https://www.defensie.nl/downloads/brochures/2015/12/15/kerngegevens-defensie		
16	See:	https://www.nationalpriorities.org/campaigns/military-spending-united-states/		
17	USAID	Budget	(2017):	https://www.usaid.gov/results-and-data/budget-spending		
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Of	course,	the	vast	differences	between	the	resources	of	state	and	non-state	actors	must	be	
viewed	within	the	context	of	their	different	goals.	The	United	States	may	have	a	defence	
budget	600	times	that	of	the	entire	MSF	budget,	but	the	realisation	of	US	goals	is	also	
greatly	more	expensive	than	the	realisation	of	MSF	goals.	However,	the	fact	remains	that	
HNGOs	experience	much	more	setbacks	as	a	result	of	a	lack	of	resources,	when	compared	
to	states.		
	
Relationships	
	
The	independence	of	HNGOs	is	a	strength	in	terms	of	its	freedom,	but	it	can	be	a	weakness	
in	terms	of	its	leverage.	Membership	of	the	EU,	NATO	and	the	UN	gives	the	Netherlands	
leverage	far	beyond	its	individual	resources.	As	an	HNGO,	one	cannot	become	a	member	of	
these	organisations.		
	
In	practice,	HNGOs	often	depend	on	relationships	that	are	established	ad	hoc	for	each	
mission	they	undertake.	In	the	search	for	the	HNGO’s	power,	it	will	be	shown	how	the	
HNGO	manoeuvres	itself	between	multiple	powerful	actors	in	order	to	secure	its	own	
interests,	namely	the	safe	access	of	its	staff	and	aid.	Ad	hoc	relationships	can	be	powerful,	
but	they	lack	the	structural	strength	that	states	enjoy	as	members	of	IGOs.		
	
Now	that	HNGOs	are	clearly	distinguished	from	state	and	other	non-state	actors,	it	remains	
to	see	how	they	fit	into	the	international	political	landscape.	What	kind	of	status	do	HNGOs	
enjoy,	as	compared	to	that	of	states	and	other	non-state	actors?	To	what	extent	are	they	
included	in	international	negotiations	–	and	if	they	are	–	how	are	they	seen	to	be	effective?		
	
The	Changing	Role	of	HNGOs		
	
As	stated	in	the	introduction,	HNGOs	fear	being	marginalized	due	to	the	militarization	and	
shrinking	of	the	humanitarian	space.	However,	an	outside	look	at	the	changing	role	of	NGOs	
in	diplomacy	and	negotiation	shows	that	NGOs	are	generally	being	involved	more	and	more	
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over	the	past	decades.	This	has	raised	questions	among	academics	and	practitioners	as	to	
the	status	of	NGOs,	and	the	effectiveness	of	involving	NGOs	in	negotiation	processes.		
	
1.3	The	(Legal)	Status	of	NGOs	
	
The	fact	that	the	role	and	influence	of	NGOs	is	increasing	can	be	seen	clearly	by	looking	at	
their	legal	status	within	the	UN.	From	the	very	beginning,	NGOs	lobbied	to	obtain	
recognition	within	the	organisation	through	a	special	provision	in	the	UN	Charter.	They	were	
successful,	as	Article	71	of	the	UN	Charter	states	that	“the	Economic	and	Social	Council	may	
make	suitable	arrangements	for	consultation	with	nongovernmental	organizations.”18	
	
In	an	article	on	the	changing	legal	status	of	NGOs	within	the	UN,	Peter	Willetts	notes	that	
the	terminology	referring	to	NGOs	changed	over	the	years.	The	idea	of	‘consultative	
arrangements’	with	NGOS	were	replaced	in	the	1990s	by	the	term	‘social	partnerships’,	
indicating	an	increase	in	the	status	of	NGOs.19	Willetts	argues	that	the	ongoing	practice	of	
involving	NGOs	in	the	decision-making	process,	at	the	very	least	as	participants,	and	
arguably	also	as	(indirect)	negotiators,	has	essentially	given	NGOs	permanent	participation	
rights	in	the	assembly.	It	is	true	that	NGOs	have	not	explicitly	been	given	this	right,	but	
Willetts	argues	that	‘with	more	than	fifty	years	of	practice	reaffirmed	by	consensus	in	each	
of	the	three	major	reviews	(…)	the	provisions	of	the	NGO	statute	can	now	be	regarded	as	
part	of	customary	international	law.’20	In	other	words,	in	practice,	NGOs	in	the	assembly	
have	obtained	a	status	comparable	to	that	of	states.		
	
Of	course,	there	are	still	very	significant	differences	between	states	and	NGOs	as	subjects	of	
international	law	and	participants	within	the	UN.	Following	Willetts’	argument,	NGOs	are	
legal	subjects	of	international	law	because	they	are	(and	have	been	for	over	50	years)	
treated	as	‘social	partners’	by	the	UN,	which	in	turn	is	formulated	as	a	provision	to	Article	
71.	Ultimately,	NGOs	therefore	derive	their	legal	status	from	their	recognition	by	the	
																																																						
18	United	Nations	(1945),	Charter	of	the	United	Nations,	24	October	1945.	Found	at:	
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf,	accessed	on:	9	May	2017.		
19	P.	Willetts	(2000),	From	“Consultative	Arrangements”	to	“Partnership”:	The	Changing	Status	of	
NGOs	in	Diplomacy	at	the	UN.	Global	Governance,	Vol.	6.	p.	191	
20	Willetts	(2000),	p.	205	
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Economic	and	Social	Council	(ECOSOC).	By	contrast,	states	are	legal	personalities	on	their	
own.		
	
With	regards	to	UN	participation,	the	major	difference	is	of	course	the	voting	right,	which	
NGOs	do	not	(and	probably	never	will)	have.	Furthermore,	NGOs	can	participate,	but	cannot	
negotiate	directly	during	the	creation	of	UN	policies,	though	the	line	between	participation	
and	negotiation	is	blurry.	In	fact,	NGO	involvement	in	negotiations	became	so	blatant	that	a	
provision	against	it	was	included	in	the	revised	ECOSOC	statutes	in	1996.21	
	
It	remains	significant,	however,	that	NGOs	have	evolved	from	being	peripheral	consultants	
to	direct	participants	in	the	UN’s	policy-making	process.	Willetts	states	that	‘the	strongest	
evidence	that	NGO	rights	have	become	established	in	customary	law	is	the	way	in	which	
NGOs	can	often	gain	access	to	intergovernmental	proceedings	even	when	the	political	
climate	turns	against	them	and	there	is	significant	opposition	to	their	presence.’22	This	
observation	strengthens	the	belief	that	the	overall	status	of	NGOs	has	grown	significantly	
over	the	last	fifty	years.	
	
Inclusion	of	NGOs	
	
Developments	in	the	(legal)	status	of	NGOs	has	naturally	been	accompanied	by	questions	
regarding	their	inclusion	in	negotiations	and	peace	processes.	The	question	as	to	whether	or	
not	NGOs	(and	in	a	broader	sense,	civil	society)	ought	to	be	included	in	a	peace	process	can	
be	asked	from	a	moral	and	a	practical	standpoint.		
	
From	the	moral	standpoint,	it	is	argued	that	in	today’s	new	wars,	civil	society	(including	
NGOs)	are	often	the	only	ones	that	are	willing	and	able	to	represent	the	interests	of	the	
victims	of	war.	As	stated	in	the	introduction,	today’s	wars	often	take	place	between	
fractured	armed	groups,	or	between	those	groups	and	the	state.	They	are	also	hallmarked	
by	the	creation	of	civilian	victims	as	a	military	strategy.	The	strategic	targeting	of	civilians	
																																																						
21	Ibid.	p.	207	
22	Ibid.	p.	205	
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has	resulted	in	shocking	numbers,	showing	that	they	represent	up	to	90%	of	the	total	
victims	of	armed	conflict.23	From	a	moral	standpoint	it	is	therefore	hard	to	justify	excluding	
representatives	from	civil	society	from	negotiations	in	a	peace	process.		
	
In	the	current	context,	this	means	that	HNGOs	like	the	MSF	and	the	ICRC	act	as	
representatives	of	the	civilian	population	in	a	conflict	zone	during	peace	negotiations	with	
state	and/or	non-state	armed	groups.	Left	to	themselves,	these	conflicting	parties	will	
represent	their	own	interests,	which	are	likely	to	cover	the	sides’	competing	economic,	
political,	legal	and	military	goals	which	sparked	the	conflict	in	the	first	place.	These	are	not	
necessarily	the	interests	of	90%	of	the	victims	of	the	conflict.	The	MSF	and	ICRC	can	
represent	these	interests	by	ensuring	an	agreement	is	formulated	which	protects	the	
human	rights	of	civilians.			
	
From	a	practical	standpoint,	the	question	is	whether	the	inclusion	of	NGOs	in	negotiations	
leads	to	more	sustainable	agreements.	A	2008	study	by	Anthony	Wanis-St.	John	and	Darren	
Kew	suggests	that	it	does.24		
	
In	their	study,	Wanis-St.	John	and	Kew	studied	twenty	different	conflicts	across	four	
continents,	taking	place	over	the	past	15	years.	For	each	conflict,	they	analysed	and	
classified	the	level	of	civil	society	involvement	as	low,	medium	or	high.	They	sought	
correlation	with	the	sustainability	of	peace	that	came	out	of	the	negotiation,	classifying	it	as	
sustained	peace,	cold	peace	(a	cessation	of	hostilities,	but	no	actual	conflict	resolution;	a	
deadlock)	and	resumed	war.		
	
In	the	cases	they	considered,	it	was	concluded	that	high	civil	society	involvement	always	
lead	to	sustained	peace.	Approximately	half	of	the	cases	which	had	moderate	civil	society	
involvement	resulted	in	sustained	peace.		Finally,	low	civil	society	involvement	resulted,	in	
most	cases,	in	a	return	to	war.	In	some	cases	it	lead	to	cold	peace.	They	therefore	concluded	
																																																						
23	Shaw,	Martin	(2005).	The	New	Western	Way	of	War:	Risk-Transfer	War	and	its	Crisis	in	Iraq.	Polity	
Press,	Cambridge.		
24	A.	Wanis-St.	John,	D.	Kew	(2008),	Civil	Society	and	Peace	Negotiations:	Confronting	Exclusion.	
International	Negotiation,	Vol.	13.	pp.	11-36	
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that	‘high	or	moderate	civil	society	involvement	in	peace	negotiations	appears	to	be	
strongly	correlated	with	sustained	peace	in	the	peacebuilding	phase.’25	
	
To	add	depth	to	their	analysis,	the	authors	then	asked	whether	the	level	of	involvement	
(Track	I	or	Track	II,	which	refer	to	higher	and	lower	political	spheres)	had	any	influence	on	
the	correlations.	Their	findings	showed	that	the	level	of	involvement	for	effective	influence	
depended	on	the	level	of	democracy	and	representation	at	the	table.	In	other	words,	if	the	
Track	I	process	was	democratic	(representative	of	all	stakeholders)	by	itself,	only	track	II	
involvement	by	civil	society	was	necessary.	However,	if	the	Track	I	process	lacked	
representation,	then	Track	I	involvement	of	civil	society	was	necessary	for	them	to	have	
effective	influence.		
	
NGOs	as	Epistemic	Communities	
	
The	question	of	how	NGOs	should	be	included	is	not	merely	a	question	of	‘what	track’,	but	
also	‘in	what	role’?		There	are	many	ways	in	which	NGOs	can	be	included	(many	roles	for	
them	to	take	on)	-	they	can	define	a	problem	and	lobby	(think	of	environmental	NGOs	
addressing	climate	change),	negotiate	directly	on	the	terms	of	an	agreement,	or	ensure	
implementation	of	an	agreement	in	a	monitoring	role.		
	
Cecelia	Albin,	who	identified	seven	such	functions,	found	that	NGOs	have	often	increased	
effectiveness	of	negotiations	by	offering	their	expertise.26		For	example,	in	environmental	
areas,	where	the	expertise	of	scientific	NGOs	helped	in	‘pinpointing	the	transboundary	
nature	of	the	problem’27	in	order	to	put	it	on	the	agenda.		Their	expertise	would	later	allow	
them	to	draft	proposals	and	set	goals	which	would	have	significant	influence	over	the	final	
agreement.	Albin	highlights	that	cases	like	this	are	not	limited	to	environmental	problems.	
For	example,	the	ICRC	has	fulfilled	a	similar	role	(agenda-setting,	drafting	proposals,	setting	
goals)	in	ensuring	negotiations	on	the	use	of	landmines	account	for	humanitarian	law	and	
																																																						
25	Ibid.	p.	30	
26	C.	Albin	(1999),	Can	NGOs	Enhance	the	Effectiveness	of	International	Negotiation?	International	
Negotiation,	Vol.	4.	pp.	371-387	
27	Ibid.	p.	379	
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‘insisting	that	the	terms	for	which	most	governments	were	ready	to	settle	were	not	far-
reaching	enough.’28	As	such,	effective	NGO	involvement	is	not	limited	to	getting	issues	to	
the	international	agenda,	but	can	also	include	direct	involvement	in	formal	negotiations	
through	drafting	proposals	and	commenting	on	government	positions.		
	
The	role	that	Albin	describes	fits	within	the	idea	of	NGOs	as	epistemic	communities,	a	term	
coined	by	Peter	Haas,	and	defined	as	a	‘network	of	professionals	with	recognized	expertise	
and	competence	in	a	particular	domain.’29	There	are	several	important	terms	in	Haas’	
definition	that	significantly	expand	the	role	of	international	NGOs	in	international	
negotiations,	beyond	a	source	of	knowledge.		
	
First	of	all,	international	NGOs	represent	an	international	network.	The	experts	they	employ	
come	from	different	states.	These	states	obviously	have	different	national	and	regional	
interests,	but	as	a	network,	the	experts	of	the	epistemic	community	are	able	to	identify	
common	problems	which	the	states	alone	cannot	or	will	not	address.	These	are	often	social	
issues	for	which	a	single	state	cannot	always	be	motivated	to	act.	Examples	are	human	
rights,	climate	change	and	nuclear	proliferation;	the	kind	of	issues	that	matter	to	NGOs.	
	
The	second	important	fact	to	note	is	that	these	epistemic	communities	consist	of	
professionals	with	recognized	expertise.	It	is	this	recognition	that	allows	the	network,	once	
an	issue	is	identified,	to	raise	it	above	the	national	level,	and	onto	the	global	political	
agenda.		
	
As	such,	NGOs,	characterised	as	epistemic	communities,	exert	influence	over	international	
negotiations	by	identifying	global	issues	and	putting	them	on	the	global	agenda.	They	do	
this	by	utilizing	their	international	network,	and	by	earning	recognition	for	their	expertise,	
giving	them	legitimacy.		
	
																																																						
28	Ibid.		
29	P.	Haas	(1992),	Introduction:	Epistemic	Communities	and	International	Policy	Coordination,	
International	Organization,	Vol.	46(1),	pp.	1-35	
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There	is,	of	course,	still	a	difference	between	influence	and	inclusion.	According	to	Albin,	
inclusion	is	determined	by	more	than	expertise	alone.	NGOs	often	depend	on	whether	or	
not	their	agenda	overlaps	with	those	of	the	governments	involved.	In	cases	where	this	is	
lacking,	it	is	the	lobbying	skills	of	the	NGO	that	determines	whether	or	not	they	will	be	
included	in	the	negotiation	process,	seeing	as	they	will	have	to	pressure	governments	into	
giving	them	access	to	the	table.	In	fact,	Albin	concludes	that	‘the	most	successful	and	
influential	NGOs	tend	to	be	wealthy,	well-connected	(among	state	delegations),	and	well-	
groomed	in	public	relations.’30		
	
Status,	Inclusion	and	Effectiveness	
	
Over	the	past	five	decades,	NGOs	have	become	increasingly	relevant	in	international	
negotiation	processes,	as	can	be	seen	by	their	changing	(legal)	status	in	the	international	
community.	The	result	is	that	NGOs	have	become	increasingly	influential	over	policy	making	
both	within	and	outside	the	UN,	and	in	peace	processes	by	working	in	tandem	with,	or	
where	necessary,	opposing	states	and	other	non-state	actors.	In	building	a	theory	on	the	
power	of	HNGOs,	the	study	so	far	of	NGO	involvement	in	negotiations	shows	what	qualities	
an	NGO	needs	to	possess	in	order	to	exert	such	influence,	and	what	has	made	their	
influence	effective.		
	
These	studies	have	shown	that	on	a	substance-level,	an	NGO’s	network	and	recognized	
expertise	will	be	decisive	for	their	inclusion.	On	a	process-level,	NGOs	need	to	be	masters	of	
public	relations	in	order	to	create	their	invitation	to	the	table,	especially	when	their	agendas	
do	not	line	up	with	those	of	the	relevant	governments.	Ultimately,	these	invitations	are	
justified	by	the	fact	that	civil	society	involvement	(including	that	of	NGOs)	appears	to	have	a	
positive	influence	on	the	sustainability	of	agreements.		
	
These	are	valuable	conclusions	for	HNGOs.	For	one,	it	informs	them	of	the	qualities	and	
skills	they	need	to	foster	in	order	to	ensure	influence	over,	and	inclusion	in	international	
negotiations.	Additionally,	their	increased	status	and	a	history	of	effective	influence	on	
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negotiations	provide	legitimacy	to	their	presence	at	the	negotiation	table,	whether	it	be	to	
provide	access	of	goods	or	to	protect	other	humanitarian	(legal)	interests.	Lastly,	one	must	
not	forget	the	moral	point	which	was	made	in	light	of	the	characteristics	of	new	wars,	
namely	that	the	presence	of	NGOs	is	necessary	in	order	to	ensure	representation	for	the	
vast	group	of	civilian	victims	of	war.		
	
Now	that	a	clear	picture	exists	of	the	unique	nature	of	HNGOs	and	their	current	place	in	the	
international	political	arena,	it	is	important	to	look	at	the	concept	of	power	as	it	exists	
today.	The	goal	will	be	to	formulate	a	concept	that	can	accommodate	HNGOs,	in	that	it	is	
inclusive	of	their	unique	skills,	as	opposed	to	the	traditional	(realist)	concept,	which	is	
unable	to	account	for	HNGO	success	in	negotiations.		
	
1.4	The	Concept	of	Power	
	
	
The	fact	that	HNGOs,	perceived	to	be	relatively	weak,	negotiate	with	armed	groups	and	still	
succeed,	refers	to	a	problem	known	as	the	‘structuralists’	paradox’,	a	name	that	was	given	
by	William	Zartman.	He	formulates	it	as	follows:	
	 	
‘How	come	weaker	parties	negotiate	with	stronger	parties	and	still	get	something?’	31			
	
There	are	several	conundrums	here.	It	is	strange,	first	of	all,	that	a	weak	party	should	want	
to	enter	into	negotiations	with	a	stronger	one	if	it	knows	it	stands	to	lose.	One	would	expect	
weaker	parties	to	avoid	that	situation.	Conversely,	it	is	strange	that	a	strong	party	would	
want	to	negotiate	with	a	weak	party.	Why	would	it	not	simply	use	its	superior	power	to	
coerce	the	other	into	doing	its	bidding?	Finally,	as	they	do	in	fact	negotiate,	it	is	unexpected	
that	the	weaker	party	succeeds	in	gaining	something.		
	
In	fact,	parties	perceived	as	weak	do	often	win	in	negotiation.	To	give	an	example,	Iceland	
famously	won	great	concessions	from	the	United	Kingdom	in	the	so-called	‘cod	wars’.32	This	
																																																						
31	I.W.	Zartman	(2008),	The	Structuralists’	Paradox	in	Negotiation.	In:	I.W.	Zartman	(2008),	
Negotiation	and	Conflict	Management,	Essays	on	Theory	and	Practice.	Routledge,	New	York.	p.	100	
32	http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00k7yzf		
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conflict	over	fishing	rights	between	Iceland,	a	nation	of	about	300,000,	and	the	UK	with	over	
60	million	inhabitants,	threatened	to	become	violent	as	the	UK	sent	its	navy	to	the	region	in	
order	to	defend	what	it	claimed	to	be	its	rightful	territorial	waters	–	a	move	that	Iceland	
could	not	possibly	counter	due	to	its	relatively	non-existent	military	capabilities.	However,	
by	the	end	of	the	cod	wars	the	UK	had	to	relinquish	its	claims,	giving	exclusive	fishing	rights	
to	Iceland	in	a	200-mile	‘exclusion	zone’	–	a	concession	which	cost	thousands	of	British	
jobs.33	The	reason	for	this	concession	is	that	Iceland	threatened	to	close	a	NATO	base	which	
protected	western	Europe	from	the	Russians	in	a	vital	strategic	position,	in	the	midst	of	the	
cold	war.	As	such,	though	Iceland	may	be	dwarfed	by	the	British	resources	and	military	
power,	its	geographic	location,	combined	with	the	context	of	the	cold	war,	made	it	the	
stronger	power	at	the	negotiation	table.		
	
The	events	of	the	cod	wars	hint	at	the	resolution	of	the	paradox;	namely	that	the	labels	of	
weak	and	strong	are	deceptive.	If	we	understand	power	(weak	vs	strong)	as	force	or	the	
possession	of	economic	and	military	resources,	then	the	paradox	stands.	However,	if	the	
notion	of	power	is	expanded,	it	will	become	apparent	that	parties	that	are	perceived	as	
weak	can	find	ways	to	level	the	playing	field.		
	
The	concept	of	power	therefore	needs	to	be	expanded	in	several	ways.	First	of	all,	a	
definition	of	power	must	be	formulated	which	goes	beyond	force.	Secondly,	assuming	that	
power	is	more	than	force	or	resources	alone,	an	explanation	of	the	possible	sources	of	
power	must	be	given.		
	
Before	moving	forward,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	research	question	refers	to	the	leverage	
of	HNGOs,	whilst	the	current	discussion	is	on	the	power	of	HNGOs.	A	party’s	leverage	refers	
to	their	ability	to	influence	another	into	achieving	a	desired	outcome.	For	the	research	
question,	the	term	leverage	was	chosen	because	it	succinctly	captures	the	ultimate	goal	of	
HNGOs	becoming	better	at	achieving	their	desired	outcome:	gaining	access.	In	the	
remainder	of	this	section,	the	concept	of	power	will	be	developed	to	be	more	or	less	
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left-a-yorkshire-community-devastated-1-7636401		
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synonymous	with	that	understanding	of	leverage,	in	the	sense	that	power	will	be	defined	so	
that	it	only	exists	when	it	leads	to	leverage.	As	such,	the	terms	leverage	and	power	will	be	
used	interchangeably	in	the	remainder	of	this	thesis.		
	
Power	as	Possessions	
	
The	idea	that	a	state’s	power	ultimately	comes	down	to	force	-	where	force	is	defined	in	
terms	of	its	economic	and	military	resources	-	derives	from	the	realist	school	of	thought	on	
international	relations.	Realism,	founded	strongly	in	the	work	of	Hans	Morgenthau34,	sees	
states	as	self-interested	actors	that	act	out	of	the	need	to	preserve	their	own	existence	–	a	
need	that	originates	from	human	nature.		
	
Later,	neorealists	led	by	Kenneth	Waltz35	departed	from	this	classical	stream	by	shifting	the	
focus	from	human	nature	to	the	anarchic	nature	of	the	international	system,	wherein	there	
is	no	central	authority	and	a	hierarchy	is	formed	based	on	the	(application	of)	resources	
held	by	a	small	number	of	superpowers.		
	
Neorealism,	also	known	as	structural	realism,	views	states	as	rational	actors	that	seek	to	
maximize	self-interest,	gather	as	many	resources	as	possible	to	increase	their	power,	and	
ultimately	to	preserve	their	own	existence.	This	is	a	paradigm	that	is	designed	to	map,	
explain	and	predict	movements	in	international	politics	on	a	grand	scale.	In	order	to	do	so,	
power	is	equated	with	possession	of	resources,	and	it	is	sometimes	quite	successful	in	doing	
so.	It	is	relatively	good	at	explaining	and	predicting	the	power	dynamic	between	the	world’s	
superpowers,	like	China,	Russia	and	the	United	States.	However,	it	also	gives	rise	to	the	
structuralists’	paradox	described	earlier.	If	states	are	indeed	rational	actors	attempting	to	
maximize	their	self-interest	and	preserve	their	own	existence	by	gaining	as	much	power	as	
possible	through	the	accumulation	of	resources,	asymmetric	negotiations	should	not	really	
take	place	–	and	if	they	do,	weak	states	(with	little	resources)	should	not	be	gaining.	As	was	
demonstrated	earlier	with	the	example	of	the	cod	wars,	this	does	in	fact	happen.		
	
																																																						
34	H.	Morgenthau	(1946),	Politics	Among	Nations,	McGraw-Hill	Education,	New	York.		
35	K.	Waltz	(1979),	Theory	of	International	Politics,	McGraw-Hill	Education,	New	York.		
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The	existence	of	the	structuralists’	paradox	is	one	of	several	problems	that	come	out	of	
defining	power	in	terms	of	possessions.	There	are	also	other	problems	which	can	be	seen	in	
the	example	of	the	territorial	dispute	between	Iceland	and	the	UK.	It	shows	that	possessions	
only	translate	to	power	when	they	can	be	applied,	or	when	one	can	credibly	threaten	to	
apply	them.	In	the	end,	the	UK	could	not	credibly	threaten	to	use	its	vastly	superior	navy	to	
enforce	its	territorial	waters,	because	the	consequences	for	its	wider	security	interests	(and	
those	of	NATO)	would	greatly	outweigh	the	benefits	of	protecting	the	rights	of	its	
fishermen.		
	
A	second	aspect	that	is	highlighted	is	that	power	is	contextual.	That	is	because	the	
applicability	of	one’s	resources	depends	on	the	context	in	which	a	dispute	is	waged.	In	the	
context	of	financial	disputes,	the	Swiss	are	a	powerful	nation	due	to	its	position	in	the	
world’s	financial	markets	and	banking	industry.	Similarly,	Italians	are	a	dominant	nation	in	
the	fashion	industry.	Both	countries’	power	pale	in	comparison	to	that	of	the	US	when	it	
comes	to	the	ability	to	wage	war,	but	they	may	actually	be	the	more	powerful	party	in	
negotiations	in	finance	or	the	fashion	industry.	
	
It	is	clear	then,	that	defining	power	in	terms	of	possessions	alone	is	unsatisfactory,	in	that	it	
cannot	lead	to	a	satisfactory	theory	on	the	methods	and	outcomes	of	asymmetrical	
negotiations.	William	Zartman	stated	that	‘power	as	force	alone	is	a	definition	that	is	
ideological,	reductionist,	inaccurate,	and	narrowing,	and	has	done	much	to	weaken	a	sound,	
thorough	discussion	of	power.’36	He	therefore	took	a	different	starting	point	for	his	
conceptualisation	of	power,	inspired	by	the	work	of	Richard	Tawney37,		Robert	Dahl38	and	
Herbert	Simon.39			
	
Power	as	the	Ability	to	Move	Others	
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37	R.H.	Tawney	(1931),	Equality.	Allen	&	Unwin.		
38	R.	Dahl	(1955),	Hierarchy,	Democracy	and	Bargaining	in	Politics	and	Economics.	In:	
Research	Frontiers	in	Politics	and	Government.	Brookings,	Washington	D.C.	
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	 25	
In	1931,	Tawney	defined	power	as	the	ability	of	one	party	to	move	another	in	an	intended	
direction.	This	definition	was	later	picked	up	by	Robert	Dahl,	a	political	theorist,	and	Herbert	
Simon,	a	psychologist	and	sociologist.	As	a	result,	Tawney’s	definition	became	widely	used	
in	the	social	sciences.		
	
This	definition	is	an	improvement	over	the	definition	of	power	as	force	because	it	
accommodates	any	type	of	power	one	would	like	to	include	in	a	theory.	It	does	not	narrow	
power	down	to	the	possession	of	resources	which	translate	to	force.	Instead,	it	states	that	
any	way	of	moving	another	in	an	intended	direction	is	a	form	of	power.	In	other	words,	if	an	
agent	possesses	nothing	at	all,	but	succeeds	in	moving	a	target	in	an	intended	direction	with	
words	alone	–	through	skill	–	then	that	agent	can	be	said	to	hold	power.	Returning	to	the	
example	of	the	cod	wars,	this	definition	is	compatible	with	the	idea	that	Iceland	held	power	
vis-à-vis	the	UK,	simply	because	it	was	able	to	move	that	party	in	its	intended	direction.		
	
At	the	same	time,	this	reveals	a	weakness	about	this	definition:	it	is	results-based.	This	
means	that	this	definition	is	–	by	definition	–	always	right.	This	raises	questions	as	to	the	
informational	value	of	this	definition.	One	can	look	at	any	conflict’s	outcome,	point	to	the	
winner	and	say:	‘according	to	my	definition,	that	party	is	more	powerful!’	Unfortunately,	
this	does	not	tell	us	anything	new.	The	definition	says	something	about	net	power	–	namely	
the	result	of	two	powers	going	head	to	head.	However,	it	says	nothing	about	the	individual	
power	of	each	party.	As	Zartman	puts	it,	this	definition	‘tells	who	wins	but	does	not	tell	the	
score!’40	This	effect	is	exacerbated	by	the	fact	that	the	definition	is	essentially	a	tautology.	
Power	is	defined	in	terms	of	ability.	In	essence,	power	is	therefore	defined	as	‘the	power	to’.	
	
The	research	question	at	hand	asks	how	unarmed	parties,	perceived	to	be	weaker,	can	gain	
leverage	in	negotiations	with	armed	state	or	non-state	groups	that	are	perceived	to	be	
stronger.	The	question	is	not	who	will	come	out	on	top.	In	fact,	much	of	negotiation	theory	
does	not	even	want	to	think	of	negotiations	as	a	simple,	distributive	process	of	winners	and	
losers,	but	as	a	search	for	integrative	solutions	that	produce	win-win	results.	The	question	is	
therefore	not	‘who	wins?’,	but	‘who	gains	what,	and	how?’	In	the	current	context,	the	
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question	is	why	and	how	a	humanitarian	NGO	could	and	does	gain	something	from	
negotiations	with	perceived	stronger	parties.	To	come	back	to	Zartman’s	analogy,	the	
‘score’	is	here	much	more	important	than	the	‘result’.		
	
Intention	&	Perception	
	
Zartman	replaces	Tawney’s	definition	with	one	of	his	own	in	two	different	ways	on	two	
different	occasions.	In	1995,	he	defines	power	as	‘the	perceived	capacity	of	one	side	to	
produce	an	intended	effect	on	another	through	a	move	involving	the	use	of	resources.’41	
Later,	in	1997	(and	again	in	edited	versions	of	this	publication),	power	is	simply	defined	as	
‘an	action	by	one	party	intended	to	produce	movement	by	another.’42	Both	definitions	have	
the	goal	of	preserving	the	useful	parts	of	Tawney’s	definition	(causing	movement	in	
another)	whilst	avoiding	its	pitfalls.		
	
The	later	definition	(1997)	is	focused	on	resolving	the	conceptual	problems	that	arise	from	
Tawneys’	tautological	definition.	In	analysing	this	definition,	Zartman	states	that	by	defining	
power	as	‘a	purposeful	action’,	it	is	defined	‘neither	as	a	component	(resources)	nor	as	a	
result	(cause)	(…)	leaving	the	analysts’	hands	free	to	study	the	relationship	of	power	with	
both	its	components	and	its	results.’43	In	other	words,	this	definition	does	not	suffer	from	
the	shortcomings	of	the	realist	definition	of	power	by	focusing	on	resources,	nor	does	it	
suffer	from	the	shortcomings	of	Tawney’s	tautological	definition	by	focusing	on	results.	The	
‘analysts’	hands	are	free’	because	this	definition	does	not	include	a	judgement	about	the	
implications	of	the	resources	of	each	party,	or	the	results	of	a	negotiation.	It	leaves	this	
open	to	analysis.	This	makes	the	definition	altogether	more	inclusive	of	different	types	and	
sources	of	power,	as	well	as	a	diversity	of	outcomes	beyond	the	win-lose	paradigm.	What	is	
perhaps	illustrative	of	this	inclusiveness	is	the	fact	that	the	use	of	intention	allows	for	the	
existence	of	power,	even	in	absence	of	movement.	Tawney’s	results-based	definition,	
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applied	to	situations	where	there	is	perfect	power	symmetry	(and	therefore	no	movement),	
would	fail	to	recognize	the	presence	of	power.	This	definition	succeeds	because	of	the	way	
in	which	the	agents’	intention	to	produce	movement	in	the	other	is	included.	
	
Zartman’s	earlier	definition	(1995),	which	states	that	power	is	‘the	perceived	capacity	of	one	
side	to	produce	an	intended	effect	on	another	through	a	move	involving	the	use	of	
resources’	contains	several	differences.	Firstly,	it	states	that	power	involves	the	use	of	
resources.	The	purpose	of	this	statement	appears	to	be	the	same	as	in	the	later,	shorter	
definition,	namely	to	differentiate	it	from	the	realist	definition	by	showing	that	resources	
are	not	the	only	active	element.	One	could	argue,	however,	that	the	later	choice	to	simply	
exclude	the	word	‘resources’	is	more	successful	in	doing	so.		
	
Another	difference	is	that	power	is	not	defined	as	an	action	but	as	a	capacity.	This	does	
suffer	from	the	same	shortcoming	as	Tawney’s	definition,	since	‘capacity’	and	‘ability’	can	
be	said	to	be	more	or	less	synonymous.	Again,	this	means	that	the	definition	is	tautological	
in	that	power	becomes	‘the	power	to….’		
	
However,	what	sets	this	definition	apart	is	the	use	of	the	word	‘perceived’.	It	should	be	
noted	that	the	1995	essay	for	which	this	definition	was	formulated	was	aimed	at	testing	
propositions	on	the	effects	of	power	asymmetry	on	conflict	outcomes.	The	aim	of	the	
definition	was	therefore	much	less	theoretical	(as	in	1997,	when	he	was	resolving	the	
structuralists’	paradox),	and	more	practical.	He	was	showing	how	theoretical	
understandings	of	actual	power	asymmetry	may	become	useless	when	the	parties’	
perceptions	of	power	relations	in	practice	do	not	match	power	relations	as	they	are	
understood	in	theory.			
	
Both	definitions	are	relevant	to	the	question	at	hand.	The	research	question	addresses	the	
structuralists’	paradox,	meaning	a	definition	must	be	used	which	allows	for	the	resolution	of	
that	paradox.	This	includes	having	a	definition	which	is	inclusive	of	different	types	and	
sources	of	power.	However,	the	research	question	also	demands	a	study	of	practice	–	
namely	negotiations	over	humanitarian	access.	As	such,	it	would	not	suffice	to	
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conceptualize	power	without	including	the	importance	of	each	party’s	perception	of	power	
relations	and	the	effect	on	conflict	outcomes.	
	
A	choice	must	be	made	between	viewing	power	as	an	action	and	as	a	perceived	capacity.	
Ideally,	a	combination	would	be	formulated	whereby	the	view	of	power	as	an	action	is	
maintained	to	prevent	the	tautological	shortcoming	of	defining	power	in	terms	of	capacity.	
However,	an	action	simply	is.	An	action	does	not	change	when	it	is	perceived	one	way	or	
another.	The	perception	of	an	action	may	change	the	way	a	party	reacts	to	that	action,	but	
the	action	itself	remains	the	same	nonetheless.	In	the	current	study,	it	is	important	that	the	
definition	is	such	that	the	perceptions	of	each	party	affects	the	power	that	those	parties	
wield,	because	this	is	a	study	of	practice.	And	in	practice,	it	has	been	demonstrated	that	
perceived	power	affects	negotiation	outcomes.	In	other	words,	perceived	power	becomes	
actual	power.	Therefore,	power	must	be	defined	in	a	way	that	includes	perception	as	a	
factor	which	influences	power	itself,	not	just	the	outcome	of	a	power	conflict.	For	the	
purposes	of	this	research,	power	will	therefore	be	defined	as	the	perceived	capacity	of	one	
side	to	produce	an	intended	effect	on	another.	
	
This	definition	is	a	shortened	version	of	Zartman’s	1995	definition,	which	adds	that	the	
intended	effect	is	achieved	‘through	a	move	involving	the	use	of	resources.’	The	factor	of	
the	‘move’	is	left	out	because,	as	practice	will	show,	sometimes	one’s	power	is	such	that	the	
intended	effect	is	achieved	without	moving	at	all,	simply	because	of	the	other’s	perception	
of	your	power.	Furthermore,	the	factor	of	‘resources’	is	left	out	because,	as	has	been	
highlighted	earlier,	this	conceptualisation	of	power	is	intended	to	be	inclusive	of	many	
different	sources	and	types	of	power.	The	result	is	a	definition	that	suffers	from	the	same	
weakness	as	Tawney’s	definition,	in	that	it	is	somewhat	tautological.	However,	for	the	
purposes	of	this	research,	this	definition	is	optimal	because	it	emphasises	the	role	of	
perception,	whilst	also	being	open	enough	to	include	different	types	of	power.		
	
Types	&	Sources	of	Power	
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Power	has	been	categorized	in	many	different	ways.	A	classic	division	is	that	between	hard	
and	soft	power.44	An	alternative	classification	is	that	of	power	as	a	combination	of	will	and	
skill.45	Additionally,	there	are	the	six	power	bases	formulated	by	French	and	Raven.46	These	
various	classifications,	their	differences	and	similarities,	as	well	as	the	way	in	which	they	
complement	one	another,	will	be	discussed	below.		
	
Hard	Power	vs	Soft	Power		
	
Joseph	Nye	uses	the	basic	distinction	between	hard	and	soft	power	in	order	to	explain	the	
power	balance	in	the	world,	whereby	hard	power	refers	to	tangible	resources,	primarily	
economic	and	military,	and	soft	power	refers	to	intangible	resources,	primarily	information.		
	
Prior	to	and	during	the	cold	war	it	was	assumed	that	power	could	be	equated	with	
economic	and	military	resources.	In	fact,	the	cold	war	rested	largely	on	the	idea	that	the	
party	with	the	most	(nuclear)	rockets	could	be	considered	the	stronger	power.	However,	it	
soon	became	apparent	that	this	was	not	entirely	the	case.	One’s	actual	power	depended	for	
a	large	part	on	one’s	ability	to	convert	those	resources	into	actions	that	would	influence	
others;	into	leverage.	Particularly	after	the	cold	war	had	ended,	one	wondered	what	a	
country’s	real	measure	of	power	would	be.		
	
It	was	in	this	context	that	Joseph	Nye	released	his	article	on	soft	power.47	He	explained	in	
detail	the	problem	of	converting	power	in	light	of	‘the	fragmentation	of	world	politics	into	
many	different	spheres.’	He	used	the	term	‘fungible’,	or	‘transferrable	from	sphere	to	
sphere’	to	refer	to	the	ability	of	a	state	to	convert	resources	into	power	between	different	
political	spheres,	whereby	spheres	refer	to	those	of	diplomacy,	finance,	military	and	
information.48	
																																																						
44	J.	Nye	(2011).	The	Future	of	Power.	Public	Affairs,	New	York.	p.	11	
45	P.J.	Carnevale	(2002).	Mediating	from	Strength,	in	Jacob	Bercovitch,	ed.,	Studies	in	
International	Mediation.	Palgrave	Macmillan,	New	York.	
46	J.	French	and	B.	Raven	(1959).	The	Bases	of	Social	Power,	in	D.	Cartwright,	ed.,	Studies	in	Social	
Power.	MI:	Institute	for	Social	Research,	Ann	Arbor.	
47	J.	Nye	(1990),	Soft	Power,	Foreign	Policy,	Vol.	80.		
48	Ibid.	p.	159	
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Nye	saw	power	as	a	relation,	and	therefore	highlighted	the	importance	of	context.	Nye	
wanted	to	show	that	in	the	context	of	the	post-cold	war	era,	soft	power	would	become	
increasingly	important	as	a	result	of	the	fact	that	the	use	of	hard	power	would	become	
increasingly	costly.	This	paradigm	is	obvious	in	light	of	the	arms	race	between	the	US	and	
Russia.	Both	parties	had	extremely	high	costs	in	converting	economic	into	military	power,	
but	the	power	relation	between	them	hardly	changed.	To	put	it	simply,	in	the	end	it	made	
no	difference	whether	both	parties	had	ten	nuclear	missiles,	or	a	thousand.	In	the	end,	as	
long	as	the	relation	remained	relatively	equal,	both	country’s	vast	economic	resources	failed	
to	convert	into	actual	power	(or	leverage)	over	the	other.		
	
Nye	witnessed	a	set	of	trends	that	diffused	power	at	the	cost	of	traditional	powers,	most	
notably	economic	interdependence,	the	rise	of	transnational	actors	and	rapid	changes	in	
technology	(particularly	in	the	fields	of	communication	and	transportation).	In	the	new	
technological	society,	governed	by	transnational	bodies,	states	are	heavily	interdependent,	
both	economically	and	politically.	In	that	context,	the	cost	of	intervention	through	hard	
power	(through	protectionism	or	war)	is	too	high,	according	to	Nye,	to	make	it	a	viable	
option	in	most	cases.	That	is	why	soft	or	co-optive	power	–	‘getting	others	to	want	what	you	
want’	–	has	becoming	increasingly	important.		
	
The	next	question	is	how	to	wield	soft	power.	To	answer	that	question,	one	must	look	at	
two	other	classifications	of	power,	starting	with	Carnevale’s	classification	of	will	and	skill.		
	
Will	and	Skill			
	
Zartman	used	a	fitting	analogy	to	underline	the	importance	of	looking	beyond	possessions	
to	account	for	an	agent’s	power:		
	
“The	problem	behind	power	as	a	possession	is	that	it	fails	to	take	into	account	the	use	of	the	
resources	through	will	and	skill.	It	takes	more	than	brushes	and	paints	to	paint	a	picture.”49		
																																																						
49	Zartman	(2008),	p.	101	
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Resource-based	concepts	of	power	–	particularly	from	the	realist	school	of	thought	–	fail	to	
take	into	account	the	ways	in	which	resources	are	applied.	This	is	a	significant	omission,	
since	the	will	and	skill	of	the	agent	utilizing	its	resources	have	significant	influence	over	the	
effects	it	is	able	to	achieve,	or	the	power	it	is	able	to	exert.	Nye	viewed	this	from	the	
perspective	of	globalisation	in	the	post-cold	war	era,	and	used	the	classifications	of	hard	and	
soft	power	to	highlight	the	importance	of	the	latter.	This	perception	will	later	be	used	to	see	
how	HNGO’s	may	be	powerful	actors	in	a	world	in	which	soft	power	is	increasingly	
important.		
	
However,	on	a	more	conceptual	level,	one	should	also	ask	what	exactly	the	terms	‘will’	and	
‘skill’	encompass.		On	this	basis,	Carnevale	developed	a	framework,	setting	out	two	sources	
of	power,	where	will	and	skill	refer	to	strategic	and	tactical	strength	respectively.	In	essence,	
the	strategy	represents	the	will	to	achieve	certain	(strategic)	goals	using	its	resources,	and	
the	tactics	represent	the	skills	with	which	one	hopes	to	achieve	those	goals.		
	
Strategic	strength	refers	to	‘what	the	mediator	brings	to	the	table’,	whereas	tactical	
strength	refers	to	‘what	the	mediator	does	at	the	negotiation	table.’50	The	link	between	
resources	and	strategy	is	made	because	the	resources	one	has	determines	the	strategies	
that	are	available.	To	put	it	simply,	an	agent	without	economic	or	military	resources	is	
unlikely	to	opt	for	a	hard-ball	strategy,	simply	because	it	is	not	viable.	Subsequently,	the	link	
between	tactics	and	skills	exist	because	they	are	of	a	behavioural	nature.	Skills	exist	
independently	of	tangible	resources	–	one	can	be	skilful	in	absence	of	resources,	or	lack	skill	
despite	being	rich.			
	
Carnevale’s	classification	is	useful	because	it	invites	a	deeper	look	into	the	way	in	which	
resources,	combined	with	the	will	and	skill	of	the	agent,	translate	to	power.	In	order	to	do	
this,	Carnevale	used	French	and	Raven’s	classification	of	the	six	power	bases.		
	
																																																						
50	Carnevale	(2002),	pp.	27-28	
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French	and	Raven’s	Six	Power	Bases51	
	
French	and	Raven	wrote	on	social	power	and	influence.	Social	influence	is	defined	by	them	
as	‘a	change	in	the	belief,	attitude,	or	behaviour	of	a	person	(…)	which	results	from	the	
action	of	another	person.’	Social	power	is	then	defined	as	‘the	potential	for	such	influence’	
or	‘the	ability	of	the	agent	to	bring	about	such	a	change	using	available	resources.’	As	stated	
earlier,	their	list	of	sources	has	been	highly	influential	in	that	it	was	used	in	various	
disciplines	as	a	basis	for	theories	on	power	relations,	including	in	the	field	of	International	
Relations.	The	list,	which	included	five	originally,	but	which	was	expanded	by	Raven	in	
196552,	is	as	follows:		
	
1. Coercive	power	
2. Reward	power	
3. Legitimate	power	
4. Expert	power	
5. Referent	power	
6. Information	power	
		
Coercive	&	Reward	Power	
	
Coercive-	and	reward	power	are	analogous	to	carrots	and	sticks.53	Using	these	types	of	
power,	a	mediator	or	negotiator	offers	rewards	for	cooperation	or	threats	of	punishment	
for	the	failure	to	cooperate	on	a	certain	issue.	These	types	of	power	are	resource-based	and	
can	be	listed	under	Nye’s	characterisation	of	hard	power.	They	are	the	main	sources	of	
power	that	are	considered	by	the	realist	school	of	thought.		
	
Legitimate	Power	
	
																																																						
51	J.	French	and	B.	Raven	(1959)	
52	B.	Raven	(1965).	Social	influence	and	power.	In	I.D.	Steiner	&	M.	Fishbein	(Eds.),	Current	studies	in	
social	psychology.	Holt,	Rinehart,	Winston,	New	York.	pp.	371–382		
53	S.	Vukovic	(2015).	Soft	Power,	Bias	and	Manipulation	of	International	Organizations	in	
International	Mediation.	International	Negotiation,	Vol.	20,	p.	425	
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Legitimate	power,	by	contrast,	is	not	resource-based.	It	is	a	form	of	power	which	depends	
entirely	on	a	party’s	perception	of	the	actor	which	attempts	to	wield	it.	This	perception,	in	
turn,	is	based	on	the	perception	of	that	actor’s	history;	their	previous	actions;	their	
achievements	and	failures.	It	also	depends	on	the	agenda	that	agent	is	perceived	to	follow.	
This	perception	can	be	a	consideration	of	the	actor’s	morals.	For	example,	a	mediator	can	
be	perceived	as	a	legitimate	power	if	it	is	perceived	as	having	a	moral,	peace-making	
agenda.	As	a	result,	non-state	actors	are	more	likely	to	be	attributed	with	legitimate	power,	
seeing	as	the	search	for	stability	and	peace	is	often	secured	in	their	charters.54		
	
Expert	&	Referent	Power	
	
Expert-	and	referent	power	are	closely	related	to	the	former.	It	is	again	the	case	that	they	
depend	strongly	on	perception.	Norway,	due	its	history	of	mediation,	is	nowadays	accepted	
as	an	expert	on	international	mediation.	The	perception	of	its	success	(despite	its	inevitable	
failings)	has	made	Norway	the	‘go-to’	mediator	when	it	comes	to	deadlocked	conflicts	that	
cannot	or	will	not	be	resolved	through	force	alone.	Non-state	actors	like	the	MSF	hold	
expert	power	in	their	field,	namely	the	provision	of	medical	aid	in	conflict	zones.		
	
Referent	power	refers	to	one’s	ability	to	lead	by	example.	Norway	could	be	said	to	hold	
referent	power	in	addition	to	its	expert	power,	because	it	is	an	exemplary	actor	within	its	
own	region,	and	because	it	invests	in	peace	around	the	world.	It	is	also	perceived	to	be	a	fair	
(even	unbiased)	mediator	(though	this	is	highly	questionable	in	reality).	Non-state	actors	
such	as	the	HNGOs	can	also	be	said	to	hold	referent	power	if	they	have	a	history	of	success	
against	the	challenges	they	encounter.			
	
Information	Power	
	
Information	power	is	the	sixth	and	last	power	base,	which	was	added	later	by	Raven.	
Information	can	be	used	in	many	ways.	It	can	be	used	as	a	carrot	or	stick;	it	can	be	given	
away	as	a	reward	or	withheld	as	a	threat.	Depending	on	the	nature	of	the	information,	the	
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threat	can	be	to	give	it	to	third	parties	or	to	make	it	public	altogether.	Information	can	also	
be	used	to	establish	oneself	as	an	expert.		
	
Information	can	be	used	to	persuade	or	dissuade.	It	can	reveal	weak	points,	motivate	
certain	strategies	or	inform	tactical	choices.	In	its	most	powerful	form,	information	can	be	
used	to	have	other	parties	want	what	you	want;	to	bring	about	a	permanent	change,	rather	
than	a	change	that	dissolves	as	soon	as	the	carrots	and	sticks	are	withdrawn.	In	short,	
information	power	refers	to	the	common	phrase:	knowledge	is	power.		
	
In	Conclusion…	
	
Section	one	has	shown	the	current	state	of	affairs,	and	how	they	came	to	be.	Beginning	with	
HNGOs,	it	was	shown	how	they	differ	from	other	actors	in	the	field,	how	their	status	has	
changed	and	in	what	ways	they	have	managed	to	be	effectively	included	in	international	
negotiations.	The	subsequent	discussion	of	power	served	as	a	demonstration	of	how	one’s	
concept	of	it	can	influence	theory	on	negotiations.	Particularly,	it	shows	how	the	realist	
definition	excludes	HNGOs	from	consideration,	making	it	incapable	of	explaining	why	they	
have	shown	to	be	powerful	in	their	own	way.	A	new	definition	of	power	was	therefore	
given;	one	that	is	inclusive	of	different	types	of	power,	which	were	subsequently	explained.		
	
In	section	two,	these	findings	will	be	related	back	to	the	broader	concept	of	this	thesis,	and	
the	research	question	at	hand.	The	theoretical	findings	above	will	be	translated	to	a	set	of	
hypotheses	which	can	be	tested	against	practice.		
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Section	Two	
Conceptual	Framework	
	
In	the	introduction,	it	was	stated	that	IN	theorists	must	carve	their	own	path	in	order	to	
solve	the	problems	that	stem	from	its	roots	in	IR	theory.	Particularly,	the	structuralists’	
paradox	that	stems	from	the	shortcomings	of	structural	realism,	which	is	not	solved	in	a	
satisfactory	manner	by	any	of	the	competing	streams,	should	be	solved	by	utilizing	the	
strengths	of	IN	study;	namely	the	in-depth	study	of	international	negotiations.	After	all,	it	is	
from	observing	small	powers	beating	big	powers	that	one	asks	the	question	in	the	first	
place.	The	study	of	such	battles	will	surely	provide	an	answer.		
	
2.1	Hypotheses	
	
The	concept	of	power	that	has	been	developed	provides	many	clues	toward	that	answer,	
which	here	will	take	the	form	of	a	set	of	hypotheses.	These	hypotheses	represent	the	
application	of	the	concept	of	power	to	the	unique	character	of	HNGOs,	as	well	as	prediction	
as	to	the	efficacy	of	(moral)	arguments,	tactics	and	strategies	they	might	attempt	to	utilize.	
The	first	is	as	follows:		
	
1. If	a	moral	argument	is	made	in	order	to	gain	humanitarian	access	to	a	conflict	
zone,	then	it	will	have	no	effect	on	that	access.		
A	moral	argument	has	been	made	for	the	inclusion	of	HNGOs,	as	they	are	often	the	only	
party	that	is	both	able	and	willing	to	represent	the	interests	of	the	victims	of	new	wars.	
There	also	seems	to	be	a	belief	among	citizens	of	most	western	states	that	HNGOs	
represent	some	universal	good,	and	refusing	access	to	an	organisation	like	the	MSF	–	
doctors	who	simply	want	to	heal	the	sick	–	is	unthinkable.	As	such,	a	hypothesis	could	be	
formulated	stating	that	HNGOs	have	a	moral	power	during	negotiations.		
Of	course,	the	reality	is	that	there	are	many	interests	at	play,	many	of	which	are	at	odds	
with	one	another.	All	parties	will	likely	claim	they	want	to	do	‘what	is	best’	for	their	people,	
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but	they	often	do	not	agree	on	what	that	is.	Therefore,	negotiations	ultimately	tend	to	be	
concluded	by	pragmatic	trade-offs,	rather	than	a	mutual	understanding	of	what	is	‘right’.		
	
Operationalising	this	hypothesis	is	made	straightforward	by	searching	for	moments	when	
any	moral	argument	is	invoked	by	the	parties	involved,	and	observing	the	effects.	Note	that	
there	is	no	single	morale	that	is	referred	to	here.	If	a	party	is	swayed	by	a	reference	to	the	
right-	or	wrongness	of	a	decision	that	is	to	be	made	(no	matter	what	that	concept	of	‘right’	
or	‘wrong’	might	entail),	this	would	negate	this	hypothesis.	If	not,	as	is	expected,	this	
hypothesis	stands.		
	
What	does	affect	changes	in	access	is	the	HNGOs	soft	power.	This	is	the	logical	conclusion	of	
the	theoretical	framework.	Before	moving	into	specific	types	of	soft	power,	it	is	important	
to	test	this	assumption.		
	
2. HNGOs	will	never	use	hard	power	in	negotiations	over	humanitarian	access	to	a	
conflict	zone;	or:	HNGOs	will	only	use	soft	power	in	negotiations	over	
humanitarian	access	to	a	conflict	zone.	
	
In	theory,	since	HNGOs	lack	the	hard	power	of	states	and	IGOs,	in	particular	their	financial	
and	military	resources,	they	rely	solely	on	soft	power	to	negotiate	access.		
	
Here,	soft	power	is	the	independent	variable	and	humanitarian	access	is	the	dependent	
variable.	Soft	power	will	be	broken	down	into	several	different	factors	in	later	hypotheses.	
For	the	second	hypothesis,	the	question	is	simply	whether	HNGOs	do	not	sometimes	rely	on	
hard	power	as	well.	Humanitarian	access	will	return	several	times	in	further	hypotheses.	
Access	is	the	best	measure	of	an	HNGO’s	power,	since	gaining	it	is	their	ultimate	goal.	As	
will	be	seen	in	the	case	analysis,	access	is	not	a	binary	variable,	but	rather	one	of	multiple	
degrees.	Access	can	be	given	to	a	specific	hospital,	a	town	or	an	entire	region.	Likewise,	it	
can	be	taken	away,	to	the	point	where	one	is	entirely	expelled	from	the	country.	For	this	
hypothesis,	any	degree	of	access	will	suffice.	In	other	words,	if	hard	power	is	used	to	
achieve	any	degree	of	access,	the	hypothesis	must	be	dismissed.			
	
	 37	
To	test	it,	it	will	therefore	be	analyzed	how	the	HNGO	uses	the	resources	it	has,	limited	as	
they	may	be	in	comparison	to	those	of	states.	Does	the	MSF	offer	money	or	medical	
resources	to	the	government	in	order	to	negotiate	access,	and	if	so,	does	it	succeed	in	
increasing	its	degree	of	access?	If	so,	then	the	idea	that	HNGOs	rely	solely	on	soft	power	
must	be	rejected.		
3. If	the	HNGO	seeks	cooperation	with	states	and/or	IGOs,	then	it	is	based	on	a	need	
for	resources,	not	status	
In	this	context,	status	refers	to	the	standing	that	HNGOs,	states	and	IGOs	have	vis-à-vis	one	
another.	Differences	in	status	can	be	observed	when	one	party	is	able	to	negotiate	
concessions	which	another	party	could	not,	solely	through	the	use	of	its	soft	power.		
	
The	study	on	the	status	of	NGOs	in	general,	argued	that	they	have	become	a	third	major	
player	on	the	world’s	political	stage,	next	to	states	and	IGOs.	It	is	argued	that	this	is	a	result	
of	a	history	of	success	and	an	improved	legal	status,	which	in	turn	stems	from	their	
recognition	as	a	partner,	rather	than	a	consultant	to	the	UN	ECOSOC.	Returning	to	the	
conceptualization	of	power,	this	would	mean	that	NGOs	have	gained	a	significant	amount	of	
legitimate	power,	rivalling	those	of	states	and	IGOs.	If	this	is	true,	HNGOs	no	longer	need	to	
depend	on	those	actors	for	their	status,	but	only	resources.		
	
The	operationalisation	of	this	hypothesis	is	simple.	If	any	cooperation	between	the	HNGO	
and	states	and/or	IGOs	is	observed,	the	question	is	whether	this	is	based	on	a	need	for	
resources	or	status.	In	other	words,	and	according	to	the	hypothesis,	if	the	HNGO	asks	a	
state	or	IGO	for	help,	that	help	should	be	limited	to	financial	or	military	resources.	Any	
observation	of	the	HNGO	cooperating	with	these	parties	because	those	parties’	status	and	
position	in	the	international	political	arena	allows	them	to	achieve	things	the	HNGO	could	
not	achieve,	would	be	grounds	to	dismiss	this	hypothesis.		
	
4. If	a	HNGO’s	expertise	and	legitimacy	are	recognised,	then	its	proposals	for	
intervention	will	be	accepted,	unless	its	proposals	are	perceived	by	the	state	as	a	
threat	to	its	sovereignty			
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In	the	theoretical	framework,	it	was	shown	that	there	are	several	forms	of	soft	power	which	
a	HNGO	might	possess,	namely	referent,	expert,	legitimate	and	information	power.	It	was	
also	shown	that	HNGOs	form	epistemic	communities	–	a	network	of	internationally	
recognized	experts	in	a	given	field.	As	an	epistemic	community,	the	HNGO	commands	
referent,	expert	and	legitimate	power.		
	
In	the	field,	the	HNGO’s	expertise	culminates	in	a	proposal	for	intervention.	In	this	case,	the	
MSF	might	propose	to	send	extra	surgeons	to	a	hospital,	or	to	set	up	field	hospitals	pro-
actively,	in	an	area	it	expects	displaced	persons	to	flee	to.	These	proposals	are	based	on	
analysis	that	is	made	by	its	international	network	of	experts	and	a	long	history	of	
intervention.		
	
Theoretically,	then,	these	proposals	are	the	ultimate	expression	of	its	soft	power.	One	
would	expect	that	these	proposals	are	accepted	by	the	other	party,	on	the	grounds	that	it	
recognizes	the	utility	of	those	proposals,	as	well	as	the	legitimacy	of	those	that	have	made	
them.	
	
However,	there	are	factors	that	might	interfere.	Power	was	defined	as	the	perceived	
capacity	to	bring	about	a	change	in	the	other.	Whilst	the	HNGO’s	power	may	be	viewed	as	
the	capacity	to	bring	about	change	for	the	victims	of	conflict,	it	may	also	be	viewed	as	being	
able	to	exert	influence	over	the	government	of	those	victims.	At	this	point,	the	HNGO’s	
power	begins	to	compete	with	(and	form	a	threat	to)	the	power	and	sovereignty	of	the	
government.	Negotiations	are	therefore	not	only	over	what	and	how	things	should	be	done,	
but	also	by	whom.	This	competition	may	interfere	with	the	acceptance	of	the	HNGO’s	
proposals	for	intervention.		
	
To	test	this	hypothesis,	the	proposals	for	intervention	which	were	made	by	the	HNGO	will	
be	studied,	as	well	as	the	response	of	the	government.	The	response,	namely	acceptance	or	
denial,	will	be	the	dependent	variable.	The	independent	variables	are	the	types	of	soft	
power,	but	also	possible	interfering	factors,	particularly	the	fight	for	control.	It	will	be	
particularly	valuable	if	similar	proposals	receive	different	responses	at	different	stages	in	
the	conflict,	because	it	will	give	clues	as	to	what	changes	prompted	the	new	response.	The	
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ultimate	question	is:	when	interfering	factors	are	removed	(particularly	any	concerns	over	
sovereignty)	are	all	proposals	for	intervention	accepted?	If	this	is	the	case,	then	the	
hypothesis	can	be	confirmed.	In	that	case,	the	idea	stands	that	HNGOs	possess	legitimate,	
expert	and	referent	power,	and	that	this	allows	them	to	negotiate	the	acceptance	of	their	
proposals,	and	by	extension,	humanitarian	access.		
	
5. If	a	HNGO	uses	information	management	in	negotiations	over	humanitarian	
access	to	a	conflict	zone	-	either	by	exerting	pressure	through	the	release	of	
information,	or	making	a	concession	by	giving	up	control	over	information	-	this	
will	always	be	accompanied	by	a	change	in	humanitarian	access	to	a	conflict	zone.	
	
The	fourth	form	of	soft	power,	which	Is	not	covered	by	the	previous	hypothesis,	is	that	of	
information	power.	Information	can	be	used	to	put	pressure	on	other	parties,	but	pushing	it	
too	far	can	blow	up	the	negotiations	and	lead	to	total	exclusion.	This	is	tied	together	closely	
with	the	finding	that	HNGOs	need	to	be	masters	of	public	relations.	The	adequate	
management	of	information	seems	to	be	a	prerequisite	for	getting	and	maintaining	a	seat	at	
the	table,	as	well	as	a	source	of	breakthroughs	or	breakdowns.	
	
The	power	of	information	makes	it	a	central	topic	of	negotiations,	particularly	in	conflict	
zones,	where	information	is	sensitive	and	potentially	incriminating.	This	leads	to	the	
hypothesis	that	changes	in	information	management	will	be	exchanged	for	a	change	in	
access.		This	hypothesis	will	be	operationalised	by	studying	the	changes	in	access	that	occur,	
and	observing	the	role	of	information	management	with	regard	to	that	change.	It	will	be	
attempted	to	establish	a	correlation,	or	if	possible,	causation,	between	information	
management	and	humanitarian	access.		
	
This	is	the	final	list	of	five	hypotheses	that	will	be	tested	in	the	next	section.	Together,	they	
represent	the	idea	that	HNGOs	gain	in	negotiations	with	armed	state	and	non-state	actors	
through	the	use	of	four	types	of	power	that	fall	outside	the	realm	of	structural	realism’s	
considerations.	It	now	remains	to	test	them	against	evidence	from	a	real-life	case.		
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Section	Three	
Theory	Testing	
	
The	Case	Study	
	
Now	that	a	comprehensive	theory	has	been	established	on	the	power	of	HNGOs,	it	remains	
to	be	seen	how	this	theory	applies	in	practice.	To	do	this,	the	method	of	process-tracing	will	
be	applied	to	a	single	case:	the	MSF’s	actions	in	the	conflict	between	the	LTTE	and	the	
government	of	Sri	Lanka.		
	
3.1	Methodology	
	
Differentiating	Process-Tracing	
	
Process-tracing	is	a	common	tool	in	the	social	sciences,	which	is	used	to	trace	causal	
mechanisms	that	mediate	between	independent	and	dependent	variables	to	produce	an	
outcome.	In	this	research,	process-tracing	will	be	used	test	the	theory	on	HNGO	power	in	
negotiating	humanitarian	access.		
	
Process	tracing	differs	from	most	other	small-n	research	methods	in	that	it	attempts	to	
make	within-case	inferences,	rather	than	cross-case	inferences.	It	is	a	meticulous	method	
aimed	at	understanding	the	causal	mechanisms	that	are	responsible	for	the	outcome	of	
interactions	between	dependent	and	independent	variables	in	a	given	case.	By	studying	
mechanisms	in	a	single	case,	one	can	build	a	theory,	test	a	theory	or	explain	an	unexpected	
outcome,	which	in	turn	can	form	the	basis	for	further	cross-examination.	By	contrast,	small-
n	research	which	aims	at	making	cross-case	inferences	is	focussed	on	formulating	
generalisations,	leaving	the	so-called	‘black	box’	of	causal	mechanisms	unopened.	While	
both	types	of	inference	have	their	own	utility,	the	task	at	hand	is	deemed	to	profit	most	
from	process	tracing,	because	it	will	test	whether	changes	in	access	actually	follow	from	
certain	types	of	power,	in	the	way	that	is	expected.	Were	one	to	use	a	method	that	aims	at	
producing	cross-case	inferences,	one	might	find	patterns	in	the	effects	of	certain	actions,	
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circumstances	and	outcomes,	but	one	would	be	unable	to	explain	the	mechanisms	behind	
them.	This	would	not	be	a	satisfying	test	of	the	theory.	That	being	said,	once	these	
mechanisms	are	understood	through	process-tracing,	the	next	logical	step	would	consist	of	
further	testing	using	cross-case	analysis.		
	
Three	Types	of	Process-Tracing	
	
The	wide	use	of	process-tracing	suffers	from	a	lack	of	consistency	when	it	comes	to	the	
rules	that	ought	to	govern	its	use.	Beach	and	Pedersen	argue	that	this	in	part	due	to	the	fact	
that	process-tracing	is	wrongly	viewed	as	a	single	method.55	The	lack	of	consensus	is	then	
explained	because	those	that	are	seeking	for	agreement	on	a	single	issue,	are	in	fact	
discussing	three	distinct	issues	which	each	have	their	own,	unique	characteristics.		
	
The	three	types	identified	by	Beach	and	Pedersen	are	theory-testing,	theory-building	and	
outcome-explaining.56		
	
The	theory-testing	variant	is	a	theory-centric	(as	opposed	to	case-centric)	type	of	process	
tracing	which	aims	to	test	a	theory	on	causal	mechanisms.	It	does	this	in	three	steps.	Firstly,	
the	theory	is	used	to	make	predictions	about	how	these	causal	mechanisms	will	manifest	in	
the	case	at	hand	–	hypotheses	are	formed.	The	case	is	then	studied	in	depth	(empirical	
research)	to	see	if	the	causal	mechanisms	are	indeed	present,	and	if	they	function	as	
predicted.	When	a	hypothesis	is	confirmed	in	this	way,	it	gives	the	theorist	increased	
confidence	that	their	theory	may	be	generalizable.	A	repetition	of	the	process	can	later	lead	
to	cross-case	analysis,	but	this	variant	is	in	itself	a	single-case	study.			
	
The	theory-building	variant	turns	this	process	around,	by	looking	at	the	case	first,	and	then	
developing	a	theory	based	on	the	analysis	of	that	case.	This	form	of	process	tracing	is	used	
to	identify	and	understand	causal	mechanisms	from	a	case,	rather	than	testing	pre-
conceived	mechanisms	against	a	case.	Whereas	theory-testing	generally	involves	a	single	
																																																						
55	D.	Beach,	R.	Pedersen	(2013),	p.	9	
56	Ibid.	p.	13	
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case,	theory-building	process	tracing	will	often	be	repeated,	looking	at	multiple	cases	in	
order	to	find	causal	mechanisms	that	are	present	systematically	in	a	certain	type	of	
situation.		
	
Finally,	the	outcome-explaining	variant	is,	unlike	the	first	two	variants,	a	case-centric	type	of	
process	tracing	which	is	aimed	at	understanding	an	unexpected	outcome	in	a	case.	The	goal	
is	not	to	identify	a	generalizable	causal	mechanism,	but	to	understand	the	specific	
mechanism	that	explains	the	outcome	in	the	case	that	is	being	studied.		
	
The	type	of	process-tracing	that	will	be	used	here	is	theory-testing.	In	part	one,	existing	
theory	on	international	negotiation	and	power,	as	well	as	developments	in	the	history	and	
status	of	NGO	involvement	in	negotiation,	have	been	used	to	develop	a	theory	on	the	causal	
mechanisms	that	allow	HNGOs	to	gain	leverage	and	access	in	negotiations	with	perceived	
stronger	parties.	A	case-study	will	be	used	to	see	if	these	causal	mechanisms	are	indeed	
present	in	the	case,	and	if	they	function	as	predicted.		
	
Test-Types	
	
Within	theory-testing,	there	are	a	number	of	tests	that	can	be	employed	to	check	whether	a	
hypothesis	about	the	presence	and	working	of	a	causal	mechanism	is	correct,	or	whether	
alternative	explanations	may	actually	be	more	accurate.	Andrew	Bennett	draws	up	four	
types:	the	hoop	test,	straw	in	the	wind	test,	smoking	gun	test	and	the	doubly	decisive	test.57		
	
Hoop	tests	can	exclude	alternative	explanations	from	consideration,	but	cannot	provide	
strong	evidence	for	an	explanation.	It	provides	‘a	necessary	but	not	sufficient	criterion	for	
accepting	the	explanation.’58	A	common	example	of	a	hoop	test	is	to	ask	whether	the	
suspect	was	in	the	city	where	the	crime	was	committed,	on	that	day.	If	they	were	not,	the	
hoop	test	is	failed	and	the	hypothesis	about	that	suspect	can	be	excluded.	However,	if	they	
were,	this	does	not	provide	strong	evidence	for	the	hypothesis.		
																																																						
57	G.	Bennett	(2010),	Process	Tracing	and	Causal	Inference,	in:	H.	Brady,	D.	Collier,	eds.	(2010),	
Rethinking	Social	Inquiry,	Rowman	and	Littlefield.	Chapter	10.		
58	Ibid.		
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A	smoking	gun	test	does	the	opposite:	it	provides	‘a	sufficient	but	not	necessary	criterion	for	
accepting	the	explanation.’59	In	other	words,	the	presence	of	a	smoking	gun	in	a	suspect’s	
hand	right	after	the	murder	is	strong	evidence	against	them,	but	the	absence	of	that	gun	
does	not	exonerate	them.		
	
The	straw	in	the	wind	test	is	a	much	weaker	test,	in	that	it	provides	‘neither	a	necessary	nor	
a	sufficient	criterion	for	establishing	a	hypothesis	or,	correspondingly,	for	rejecting	it.’i	In	
other	words,	they	provide,	at	best,	circumstantial	evidence	for	or	against	a	hypothesis,	as	
when	it	is	found	that	a	suspect	has	been	frequenting	a	shooting	range	in	months	prior	to	a	
shooting.		
	
Finally,	the	doubly	decisive	test	provides	‘a	necessary	and	sufficient	criterion	for	establishing	
a	hypothesis.’60	In	other	words,	just	one	occurrence	of	passing	this	test	is	enough	to	confirm	
one	explanation	and	exclude	all	others.	For	example,	this	would	be	the	case	if	there	was	
video	evidence	of	a	suspect	in	the	act	of	shooting,	which	would	seal	the	case	and	exonerate	
all	other	suspects.		
	
These	four	types	of	test	each	provide	different	types	of	evidence,	each	with	their	own	
weight.	In	the	case	study,	it	will	of	course	be	ideal	to	find	doubly	decisive	and	smoking	gun	
evidence.	However,	in	the	event	that	this	fails,	it	will	be	important	to	consider	alternative	
explanations	for	the	outcomes	that	will	be	studied,	and	to	subject	these	to	hoop	tests	in	
order	to	approach	the	truth	through	a	process	of	elimination.	To	aid	this	process,	it	can	also	
be	helpful	to	find	a	large	number	of	evidence	in	the	form	of	straw	in	the	wind	tests.		
	
Critics	and	Cautions	
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There	has	been	significant	criticism	on	process-tracing	as	a	whole,	as	well	as	cautions	
against	common	pitfalls	for	process-tracers,	which	are	worth	noting	before	embarking	on	
the	case	study.		
	
King,	Keohane	and	Verba	worry	that	process	tracing	suffers	from	the	so-called	‘infinite	
regress’	problem.61	Their	worry	is	that	there	is	no	end	to	the	inquiry	into	the	black	box	of	
causal	mechanisms,	because	these	mechanisms	can	always	be	traced	back	to	an	earlier	
cause.	This	infinite	regress	of	causes	is	a	threat	to	process	tracing	because	it	prevents	one	
from	pointing	out	the	‘real’	or	‘original’	cause,	but	rather	plunges	one	into	a	never-ending	
search.	To	put	it	simply,	a	researcher	may	find	a	causal	link	between	point	1	and	point	2	–	
namely	point	1.5.	However,	there	may	be	an	additional	link	between	1	and	1.5	–	namely	
1.25,	and	then	point	1.125,	etc…		
	
A	second	criticism	is	referred	to	by	Bennett	as	the	degrees	of	freedom	problem.62	This	
problem	holds	that	there	are	simply	too	many	variables	in	a	small	number	of	cases,	to	come	
to	any	significant	conclusion.	This	would	be	unacceptable	in	statistical	analysis,	where	the	
opposite	balance	(few	variables,	many	cases)	is	sought	after.			
	
Both	problems	come	down	to	the	great	(even	infinite)	number	of	variables	that	threaten	to	
cripple	process	tracing.	However,	Bennett	argues	that	this	does	not	actually	happen.	He	
states	that	‘what	matters	is	not	the	amount	of	evidence,	but	its	contribution	to	adjudicating	
among	alternative	hypothesis.’63	In	other	words,	even	if	there	were	an	‘infinite’	number	of	
variables,	not	all	variables	need	to	be	studied.	The	researcher	excels	in	finding	those	
variables	which	contribute	to	differentiating	the	various	hypotheses.	This	is	the	function	of	
the	four	tests	described	above.	The	most	potent	example	is	the	doubly	decisive	test.	In	a	
bank	robbery,	there	may,	in	theory,	be	an	infinite	number	of	variables	that	one	could	
choose	to	study,	but	a	video	of	the	robbery	in	action,	and	the	faces	of	the	robbers	in	clear	
sight,	solves	the	case	and	with	it	the	degrees	of	freedom	problem.	The	infinite	regress	
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62	Bennett	(2010)	
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problem	could	apply,	of	course.	One	could	say	that	the	cause	of	a	bank	teller’s	death	was	
caused	by	the	bank	robber,	who	shot	him.	One	could	then	find	an	additional	causal	link,	by	
showing	that	the	robber	pulled	the	gun’s	trigger,	and	further	down	to	the	action	of	the	
gun’s	hammer,	even	to	the	production	of	the	bullet	by	a	machine	in	a	factory	in	an	
altogether	different	country.	In	that	sense,	the	infinite	regress	problem	exists.	However,	in	
practice	it	is	clear	to	the	researcher	that	the	level	at	which	the	causal	link	is	relevant	to	the	
case	is	that	of	the	robber	shooting	the	bank	teller	–	because	this	is	ultimately	what	fulfils	the	
goal	of	arresting	the	suspect	and	resolving	the	case.	In	the	same	way,	whilst	studying	the	
case	of	Sri	Lanka,	it	will	be	possible	in	theory	to	fall	into	an	infinite	regress,	but	in	practice	it	
will	become	apparent	to	what	level	of	analysis	one	will	have	to	go	in	order	to	identify	the	
causal	links	which	are	relevant	to	the	case.		
	
A	final	and	particularly	important	point	is	that	caution	must	be	exercised	toward	possible	
bias	that	might	exist	in	sources	describing	the	case	at	hand.	Bennett	notes	that	this	is	
‘especially	important	in	process	tracing	on	social	and	political	phenomena	for	which	
participating	actors	have	strong	instrumental	or	ideational	reasons	for	hiding	or	
misrepresenting	information	about	their	behaviour	or	motives.’64	Ultimately,	Bennett	
advises	the	process-tracing	researcher	to	‘cast	the	net	widely’,	to	be	‘meticulous	and	
evenhanded’	and	to	anticipate	potential	bias	in	the	evidence.65	These	principles	will	be	
adhered	to	in	studying	the	following	case.		
	
3.2	Choosing	the	MSF	
	
One	of	the	reasons	for	choosing	the	MSF	and	its	report	as	the	main	source	is	the	fact	that	
the	organisation	has	been	extraordinarily	candid	in	describing	the	events	that	took	place	
between	2005	and	2009.	In	studying	the	material,	it	becomes	clear	that	it	presents	
uncomfortable	truths	at	its	own	peril.	For	example,	at	one	crossroads	the	MSF	had	to	
choose	between	divulging	human	rights	offences	it	had	observed	to	the	international	press,	
which	would	likely	lead	to	a	retraction	of	its	staff’s	work	visas,	or	staying	silent	in	order	to	
																																																						
64	Ibid.		
65	Bennett	(2010)		
	 46	
retain	those	visas,	and	with	it,	the	ability	to	provide	medical	aid	to	thousands	of	desperate	
civilians.	The	book	does	not	shy	away	from	revealing	the	choices	it	has	had	to	make	in	light	
of	inhumane	dilemma’s,	knowing	it	would	lead	to	heavy	criticism.	The	MSF	chose	this	path	
intentionally,	in	order	to	reveal	the	challenges	faced	by	modern	HNGOs,	and	this	choice	
speaks	in	favour	of	the	truthfulness	of	their	accounts.		
	
However,	in	the	end	one	cannot	deny	that	the	MSF	will	suffer	from	bias.	An	additional	
reason	for	choosing	this	case	was	therefore	the	availability	of	a	reliable	alternate	source	on	
the	same	events,	namely	an	internal	UN	report	on	their	actions	during	the	civil	war.66	This	
allows	us	to	cross	reference	the	MSF’s	claims,	especially	with	regards	to	the	government’s	
behaviour	in	giving	access.		
	
Additionally,	though	the	MSF	account	may	make	its	own	conclusions	about	the	causal	
mechanisms	at	play,	this	research	will	develop	its	own,	broader	set	of	alternative	
hypotheses	so	as	not	to	exclude	possible	explanations	of	the	outcomes	that	will	be	
observed.		
	
3.3	Case	Description	–	Civil	War	in	Sri	Lanka	
	
The	Sri	Lankan	Civil	War	was	an	ethnic	and	territorial	conflict	between	the	Liberation	Tigers	
of	Tamil	Eelam	(LTTE)	and	the	government	of	Sri	Lanka.	In	this	conflict,	the	LTTE,	established	
in	1976	and	claiming	to	represent	the	Tamil	population,	fought	for	an	independent	state.	
The	Tamil	are	a	minority,	ca.	10%	of	the	total	population	of	Sri	Lanka,	as	opposed	to	the	
Sinhalese,	who	represent	ca.	80%	of	the	total	population.67		
	
The	ethnic	tensions	date	back	over	sixty	years,	to	the	time	of	British	rule,	and	the	civil	war	
itself	lasted	nearly	thirty	years.	The	starting	point	is	an	ambush	carried	out	by	the	LTTE	in	
1983,	in	which	13	Sri	Lankan	soldiers	were	killed.	In	the	fallout	of	these	events,	
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approximately	2500	Tamils	lost	their	lives.68	The	war	that	ensued	would	displace	hundreds	
of	thousands	of	people,	and	the	total	casualties	are	estimated	by	the	UN	to	be	between	
80,000-100,000	people.69	
	
State	Involvement	
	
The	conflict	drew	many	international	actors	for	varying	reasons.	India’s	Research	and	
Analysis	Wing	(RAW),	their	external	intelligence	agency,	supported	the	LTTE	in	its	early	
years,70	but	withdrew	support	as	the	LTTE’s	tactics	began	including	abductions,	recruitment	
of	child	soldiers,	suicide	bombings	and	other	terrorist	activities.	The	US	labelled	the	LTTE	as	
a	terrorist	organization	in	199771,	and	was	soon	joined	by	India,	the	EU,	Canada	and	
Australia.72		
	
Perhaps	the	most	notable	involvement	was	that	of	Norway	as	a	mediator,	who	successfully	
brokered	a	ceasefire	agreement	(CFA)	in	2002.	While	the	agreement	itself	would	largely	
hold	for	the	next	two	years,	the	subsequent	peace	talks	quickly	broke	down.	The	CFA	held	
further	after	2004	as	the	nation	was	struck	by	a	devastating	tsunami,	making	civil	war	
essentially	impossible.	However,	in	2005,	the	conflict	escalated	once	again	upon	the	
assassination	of	the	Foreign	Minister	of	Sri	Lanka,	prompting	Norway’s	monitors	to	leave	
the	country.	In	the	years	that	followed,	a	devastating	war	broke	out	that	would	displace	
hundreds	of	thousands	of	people,	and	cause	tens	of	thousands	of	civilian	casualties.	Finally,	
the	Government	declared	its	victory	in	2009,	when	they	killed	the	leader	of	the	LTTE.73	In	
the	period	between	2005	and	2009,	and	in	the	aftermath	of	the	war,	the	UN	and	
international	NGOs	rang	the	alarm	over	the	abominable	humanitarian	crisis.		
	
UN	&	NGO	Involvement	
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In	2007,	Human	Rights	Watch	released	a	report	that	claimed	war	crimes	had	been	
committed	by	both	sides.74	The	watch	dog	reported	a	long	list	of	abuses,	including,	but	not	
limited	to,	abductions	and	disappearances;	arbitrary	arrests	and	detention;	prevention	of	
civilian	flight;	attacks	on	the	media;	undue	pressure	on	NGOs	and	a	lack	of	witness	
protection.		
	
The	LTTE	was	often	accused	of	using	civilians	as	human	shields	by	intentionally	seeking	
refuge	in	densely	populated	areas.75	The	government,	in	turn,	was	accused	by	the	UN	of	
shelling	no-fire	zones,	which	were	declared	as	such	due	to	the	high	civilian	population.76		
	
As	a	result	of	the	tactical	choices	of	both	sides,	the	civilian	population	ended	up	being	the	
main	victims	of	decades	of	war.	The	fact	that	the	war	was	highly	aggressive	from	both	sides,	
meant	that	there	was	a	need	for	independent	aid.	Massive	groups	of	displaced	and	
wounded	civilians	were	in	need	of	shelter,	clean	water,	sanitation,	food	and	medical	
assistance.	
	
Providing	this	humanitarian	assistance	was	not	a	simple	matter.	The	government	was	
increasingly	wary	of	NGOs.	Firstly,	NGOs	had	a	tendency	to	report	government	misdoings	in	
the	international	press,	hurting	their	image	and	credibility,	and	potentially	its	economic	
interests	as	well.	Donors	did	not	want	to	be	seen	financing	a	government	which	stood	
accused	of	human	rights	violations.	The	government	therefore	maintained	strict	monitoring	
of	NGOs	that	were	active	in	Sri	Lanka,	and	as	will	be	seen	later,	threatened	those	that	did	
not	comply	with	its	demands.	The	fear	of	bad	press	became	a	massive	problem	in	the	later	
stages	of	the	war,	as	it	prompted	the	government	to	keep	NGOs	away	entirely	from	the	
worst	areas	–	the	places	where	help	was	needed	the	most	–	because	it	feared	the	NGOs	
would	report	on	the	circumstances.	This	policy	created	a	vicious	cycle.		
	
A	second	problem	was	that	the	government	did	not	want	NGOs	to	provide	aid	in	areas	it	did	
not	fully	control.	Of	course,	the	government	did	not	want	aid	to	end	up	in	the	hands	of	LTTE	
																																																						
74	Found	at:	https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/srilanka0807/		
75	See:	https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2010/country-chapters/sri-lanka		
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members,	the	people	they	were	trying	to	defeat.	This	was	problematic,	as	the	LTTE	sought	
refuge	among	civilian	populations.	In	practice,	this	therefore	meant	that	large	civilian	
populations	were	prevented	from	receiving	aid	because	the	government	suspected	that	the	
LTTE	was	hiding	among	them.	This	same	phenomenon	was	later	repeated	as	civilians	
arriving	at	camps	for	internally	displaced	persons	(IDPs)	would	be	mistreated,	interrogated	
and	denied	access	to	most	aid	due	to	suspicion	of	LTTE	membership.		
	
The	situation	as	a	whole	created	a	situation	in	which	an	NGO’s	work	was	in	all	matters	
conditional.	An	NGO’s	staff	depended	on	work	visas	to	stay	in	the	country.	Receiving	it	in	
the	first	place,	as	well	as	keeping	it	for	any	length	of	time,	depended	entirely	on	the	
government’s	judgement	of	the	NGO’s	behaviour.	Giving	an	interview	that	could	be	
interpreted	as	critical	of	the	government,	could	result	in	(the	threat	of)	revocation.		
	
Access	was	equally	conditional.	Access	to	towns	outside	government	controlled	areas,	but	
also	to	camps,	hospitals	and	other	areas	within	the	government’s	control	were	not	a	given.	
Whether	or	not	an	organisation	would	be	given	access	depended	on	the	government’s	
judgement	of	that	organization,	as	well	as	other	factors,	particularly	international	pressure.	
The	exact	reasons,	of	course,	are	the	object	of	this	research.	In	short,	for	HNGOs,	the	ability	
to	be	present	and	working	in	the	country,	as	well	as	the	access	to	most	areas,	was	
conditional	and	therefore	the	subject	of	negotiation.		
	
‘Weapons’	of	Choice	
	
Several	‘weapons’	were	used	by	the	parties,	particularly	the	government,	in	order	to	
manage	access.	While	the	government	did,	directly	or	indirectly,	use	violence	against	
HNGOs,	the	latter	could	only	respond	by	using	soft	power	tools.	As	such,	negotiations	over	
access	were	dominated	by	soft	power	tools,	including	public	relations,	(international)	
media,	bureaucracy	and	visa	control.	Before	moving	into	theory-testing,	it	is	worth	
considering	these	different	methods	used	to	manage	one’s	image,	as	well	as	humanitarian	
access.			
	
Public	Relations	&	The	Media	
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Public	relations	were	an	integral	part	of	the	civil	war	for	all	parties	involved.	In	the	MSF	
report,	Fabrice	Weissman	(author	of	the	MSF	report)	cites	a	Sri	Lankan	pundit,	claiming	that	
the	LTTE	sought	a	new	confrontation	after	the	2004	tsunami	because	it	predicted	that	the	
government’s	army	would	commit	war	crimes,	which	would	‘isolate	it	internationally’	and	
that	‘media	coverage	of	the	army’s	violence	was	(…)	the	LTTE’s	main	political	asset	on	the	
international	scene.’77	
	
The	government,	in	turn,	used	the	LTTE’s	tactics	against	them.	The	LTTE	hid	among	civilians	
in	order	to	force	the	government’s	hand,	making	them	choose	between	halting	their	
offensive	or	committing	war	crimes	against	civilians.	In	response,	the	government	decided	
to	brand	their	campaign	as	a	‘humanitarian	mission	seeking	to	free	innocent	civilians	held	
hostage	by	the	LTTE.’78	The	government’s	propaganda	machine	attempted	to	incorporate	
NGOs	and	UN	agencies	‘into	its	pacification	policies’	with	some	success.	In	2009,	the	MSF	
‘attempted	to	become	a	major	cog	in	the	military-humanitarian	machine	[of	the	
government,	ed.]	in	the	hope	of	lessening	its	brutality.’79		
	
The	government	used	their	control	of	the	media	in	order	to	control	the	UN	and	NGOs.	As	
can	be	seen	from	the	admission	above,	it	was	finally	quite	successful	in	doing	so.	There	was	
a	general	distrust	of	NGOs	in	Sri	Lanka,	due	to	the	massive	influx	of	those	organisations	in	
2004,	which	was	dubbed	by	the	country’s	citizens	as	‘the	second	tsunami’.	This	distrust	was	
exploited	by	the	government,	who	would	accuse	NGOs	of	being	‘war	profiteers’	and	
‘stooges	of	the	terrorists.’80	The	UN	report	states	that	‘government-friendly	media	and	
senior	authorities	published	false	and	intimidating	allegations	against	UN	agencies	and	
staff.’	They	claim	the	government’s	control	went	even	further,	stating	that	‘the	UN’s	
computer	system,	emails	and	telephones	were	understood	to	be	entirely	compromised	by	
external	surveillance.’81	
																																																						
77	F.	Weissman	(2011),	Sri	Lanka:	Amid	All-Out	War.	In:	C.	Magone,	M.	Neuman,	F.	Weissman,	eds.	
Humanitarian	Negotiations	Revealed:	The	MSF	Experience.	C.	Hurst	&	Co.	Ltd.,	London.	pp.	16-17	
78	Ibid.	p.	17	
79	Ibid.	p.	18	
80	Ibid.	p.	18	
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It	is	clear	from	the	earlier	admission	of	its	choice	in	2009,	that	the	MSF	also	realised	the	
power	of	information	and	PR,	as	did	other	active	organisations.	Next	to	the	MSF	and	UN,	the	
ICRC	was	a	third	major	player	in	this	time.	However,	unlike	the	MSF	and	UN,	the	ICRC	did	
not	release	a	report	on	the	events	during	the	war,	and	in	fact	did	not	release	a	single	article	
related	to	Sri	Lanka	between	2005	and	2012.82	Detailed	reports	of	its	work	in	the	country	do	
not	resume	until	2014.	This	was	a	clear	strategic	choice.		
	
Before	2009,	when	the	MSF	decided	to	become	‘a	cog	in	the	machine’,	they	were	often	
vocal	and	critical	of	the	government’s	actions.	On	one	occasion,	the	MSF’s	international	
president	called	a	press	conference	to	deny	allegations	that	they	had	been	secretly	
supporting	pro-LTTE	forces.	This	represented	a	public	and	direct	contradiction	to	the	
government,	who	were	the	source	of	the	allegations.	On	another	occasion	in	2006,	the	
French	section	of	the	MSF	published	a	press	release	which	denounced	the	murder	of	17	Sri	
Lankan	employees	of	Action	Contre	le	Faim	(ACF)	and	‘the	lack	of	medical	help	for	tens	of	
thousands	of	people	living	at	the	heart	of	the	military	offensive.’83	The	early	use	of	its	
information	power	by	the	MSF	was	then	very	much	aimed	at	divulging	information	to	the	
international	media	in	order	to	exert	pressure	on	the	government.	This	tactic	was	used	in	an	
attempt	to	force	a	change	in	the	government’s	main	tool	in	controlling	humanitarian	access:	
bureaucracy	and	visa	control.		
	
Bureaucracy	&	Visa	Control	
	
Another	way	in	which	the	government	aimed	to	reduce	access	was	through	the	use	of	slow	
bureaucracy.	Gaining	access	to	new	areas	or	hospitals	would	require	an	organisation	to	
hand	in	a	formal	request	at	one	of	the	government’s	ministries.	By	intentionally	slowing	
down	the	bureaucratic	process	the	government	would	essentially	deny	access	without	
explicitly	rejecting	the	application.	In	fact,	access	would	often	be	given	in	the	end,	but	only	
																																																						
82	For	a	list	of	their	publications	on	Sri	Lanka,	see:	https://www.icrc.org/en/resource-
centre/result?sort=date+desc&r%5B0%5D=document_type%3A%22Article%22&f=places%3A%22Asi
a+and+the+Pacific%2FSri+Lanka%22&start=10		
83	F.	Weissman	(2011),	p.	20	
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after	the	immediate	need	had	passed.	In	February	2007,	the	MSF	‘did	not	manage	to	obtain	
the	necessary	authorisations	(…)	before	the	government	forces	recaptured	the	zone	(…)	
making	the	planned	intervention	irrelevant.	In	May	of	the	same	year	the	MSF	proposed	to	
provide	surgical	support	for	a	hospital	overflowing	with	patients,	but	‘Colombo’s	
administrative	obstruction	delayed	the	intervention’	and	access	wasn’t	given	until	‘the	
hospital’s	activities	had	returned	to	normal.’84	The	same	tactic	would	be	used	in	order	to	
stall	the	import	of	humanitarian	goods,	by	stalling	handouts	of	import	licenses.	In	the	most	
extreme	cases,	the	government	would	threaten	the	revocation	of	work	visas,	as	in	
September	2006,	when	the	MSF	received	an	expulsion	order.85	The	UN	report	confirms	this	
practice	succinctly,	stating	that	‘authorities	had	used	the	control	of	visas	to	sanction	staff	
critical	of	the	state.’86	
	
Safety	Guarantees	&	Violence	
	
A	final	way	in	which	the	government	managed	access	was	by	revoking	its	guarantees	that	it	
would	protect	staff	against	violence,	both	from	the	LTTE	and	from	its	own	shelling	practices.	
In	September	2008,	the	government	told	the	UN	it	could	no	longer	guarantee	the	safety	of	
its	staff	in	the	Wanni.87	As	stated	earlier,	17	ACF	staff	were	killed	shortly	after	the	
government	regained	control	of	a	town	in	which	they	were	active.	The	Sri	Lankan	
Monitoring	Mission	held	the	government	responsible	and	the	actions	were	condemned	by	
the	UN.88	On	other	occasions,	government	shelling	injured	NGO	staff.	These	actions	created	
an	environment	in	which	NGOs	including	the	MSF	had	to	act	with	extreme	caution	in	regard	
to	the	safety	of	their	staff.		
	
The	UN	report	shows	that	the	government	would	ultimately	tell	NGOs,	whether	it	be	sincere	
or	for	strategic	purposes,	that	it	could	no	longer	secure	the	safety	of	their	staff.89	By	telling	
aid	organisations	that	it	could	no	longer	guarantee	their	safety	in	a	certain	area,	it	was	
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essentially	removing	their	access,	as	these	organisations	could	no	longer	responsibly	send	
staff	there.		
	
In	the	first	two	years	of	their	renewed	activities	in	Sri	Lanka,	the	MSF	learned	that	
cooperation	with	local	authorities	and	the	Ministry	of	Health	would	be	insufficient	for	them	
to	fulfil	their	mission.	As	Weissman	puts	it,	‘despite	support	from	the	local	authorities	and	
the	Ministry	of	Health	(…)	failure	followed	failure	(…)	and	it	became	clear	that	no	decision	
could	be	taken	without	the	approval	of	the	Ministry	of	Defence	and	the	president’s	
entourage.’90	As	such,	gaining	and	retaining	any	form	of	access	relied	on	continued	
negotiations	with	the	government.		
	
3.4	Theory	Testing	
	
It	now	remains	to	look	at	the	case	in	even	more	detail,	and	comparing	the	analysis	to	the	
hypotheses.	In	this	section,	each	hypothesis	will	be	examined	and	tested	against	relevant	
events	from	the	case	study,	in	order	to	make	within-case	inferences	about	their	accuracy.		
	
Hypothesis	1:	If	a	moral	argument	is	made	in	order	to	gain	humanitarian	access	to	a	
conflict	zone,	then	it	will	have	no	effect	on	that	access.	
In	the	eyes	of	most	Western	people,	HNGOs	do	the	‘right’	thing	–	whatever	that	may	be.	
The	wording	of	this	last	hypothesis	was	chosen	carefully	so	as	not	to	make	any	implications	
about	a	single	set	of	morals	(eg.	Christian	morals,	Western	morals,	Buddhist	morals,	etc.)	
The	hypothesis	therefore	only	states	that	at	no	point	will	an	appeal	to	a	moral	argument	–	
of	whatever	sort	-	make	any	significant	difference	during	negotiations.	Keeping	to	
generalities,	such	an	argument	would	make	an	appeal	to	what	is	‘right’	or	‘wrong’	in	the	
eyes	of	the	claimant.		
	
In	section	one,	it	was	argued	that	there	is	a	moral	argument	to	be	made	for	the	inclusion	of	
NGOs	at	the	negotiation	table,	since	the	combatant	parties	often	fail	to	take	into	account	
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the	interests	of	the	victims	of	their	conflict.	NGOs	would	then	be	a	third	party	at	the	table	in	
order	to	ensure	the	protection	of	the	victims’	interests.	In	this	particular	case,	then,	one	can	
make	a	moral	argument	that	including	the	MSF	in	negotiations	would	be	the	‘right’	thing	to	
do,	because	they	are	the	only	ones	who	could	represent	the	innocent	citizens,	without	
partiality	that	might	exist	due	to	the	other	party’s	economic,	political	and	military	interests.		
	
In	the	case	at	hand,	there	are	no	occasions	on	which	the	MSF	directly	cites	a	moral	
argument	in	order	to	obtain	access.	On	one	occasion	the	MSF	released	a	press	statement	
‘denouncing	the	murder	of	the	ACF	workers	and	the	“lack	of	medical	help	[for]	tens	of	
thousands	of	people	living	at	the	heart	of	the	military	offensive.”’91	This	can	be	seen	as	an	
indirect	moral	argument	made	by	the	MSF,	saying	they	ought	to	be	given	access	in	order	to	
bring	an	end	to	the	lack	of	medical	help.	However,	this	did	not	achieve	the	desired	effect,	
and	in	a	subsequent	meeting	with	the	president’s	brothers	(who	functioned	as	his	special	
adviser	and	secretary	of	defence)	they	were	unable	to	negotiate	access	to	uncleared	zones.		
	
If	moral	arguments	played	any	significant	role	in	the	negotiations	at	all,	it	would	have	to	be	
that	the	government	was	wary	of	giving	HNGOs	access	because	their	morals	would	oblige	
them	to	be	vocal	about	the	things	they	observed,	as	will	be	argued	in	more	detail	during	the	
testing	of	subsequent	hypotheses.	For	now,	it	is	clear	that	the	idea	that	HNGOs	succeed	in	
turning	the	government’s	‘no’	into	a	‘yes’	because	it	is	the	‘right’	thing	to	do,	finds	no	match	
in	the	realities	of	this	case.	It	would	seem	that,	fundamentally,	negotiations	over	access	are	
the	same	as	all	others:	an	‘exchange	of	concessions	and	compensations.’92	
	
Hypothesis	2:	HNGOs	will	never	use	hard	power	in	negotiations	over	humanitarian	access	
to	a	conflict	zone;	or:	HNGOs	will	only	use	soft	power	in	negotiations	over	humanitarian	
access	to	a	conflict	zone.	
	
If	not	by	some	moral	argument,	the	MSF	would	presumably	have	to	use	its	soft	power	in	
order	to	negotiate	access.	This	hypothesis	offers	explanation	(a)	that	humanitarian	access	is	
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always	gained	through	the	use	of	soft	power	by	HNGOs.	As	stated	in	the	methodology	
section,	alternative	explanations	will	be	formulated	in	order	to	test	the	hypotheses.	In	this	
case,	an	alternative	explanation	which,	if	confirmed,	would	refute	that	explanation	would	
be	(b)	that	access	is	sometimes	gained	through	the	use	of	hard	power,	defined	in	section	
one	in	terms	of	military	and/or	economic	resources.		
	
To	adjudicate	between	these	two	explanations,	a	doubly	decisive	test	will	be	used.	If	
explanation	(b)	were	to	pass	a	doubly	decisive	test	(eg.	if	evidence	was	found	of	the	use	of	
hard	power	to	gain	access),	this	would	confirm	that	hypothesis	and	exclude	all	others,	
including	(a).		
	
In	July	of	2009,	a	full-blown	crisis	was	ongoing	due	to	the	rapid	displacement	of	
approximately	170,000	civilians.	The	internment	camps	were	struggling	to	maintain	
satisfactory	health	and	hygiene	standards	in	light	of	a	desperate	lack	of	capacity.	Donors	
and	NGOs	were	asked	to	contribute	to	permanent	improvements	to	the	camps.	The	big	
donors,	namely	the	UN,	EU	and	USA,	who	were	funding	the	camps	with	$700,000	a	day,	
refused	the	request	‘to	underline	the	temporary	nature	of	the	internment	camps.’93	These	
parties	believed	a	quick	resettlement	of	IDPs	was	necessary,	and	therefore	opted	out	of	
supporting	more	permanent,	cement	structures.	By	contrast,	the	MSF	decided	to	expand	its	
operations	during	this	time,	replacing	their	tents	with	semi-permanent	buildings	and	also	
providing	new	services,	such	as	radiology,	ultrasound	and	laboratory	testing.	This	expansion	
represented	a	significant	investment	of	resources.	Does	this	represent	the	use	of	hard	
power	to	negotiate	access?		
	
The	fact	is,	all	of	the	MSF’s	activities	require	the	investment	of	resources,	but	this	does	not	
necessarily	equate	to	the	use	of	hard	power	as	a	negotiation	strategy.	The	question	is	
whether	economic	contributions	were	used	as	a	strategic	power	during	negotiations	over	
access.	In	the	example	above,	this	was	certainly	not	the	case.	The	decision	to	expand	its	
operations	was	made	after,	and	in	response	to,	changes	that	were	already	made	by	the	
government,	including	increased	transparency,	release	of	internees	and	general	improved	
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conditions	in	the	camps.	This	concession	stood,	even	if	the	MSF	decided	to	change	nothing.	
The	decision	to	expand	was	therefore	not	a	negotiation	strategy	meant	to	provoke	
concessions	from	the	government,	but	a	solitary	action	by	the	MSF	aimed	to	contribute	to	
the	execution	of	its	mission.		
	
Things	are	more	complex	in	a	second	case,	when	local	authorities	requested	that	the	MSF	
contribute	staff	as	they	were	overwhelmed	by	the	amount	of	IDPs	they	had	to	treat.	The	
MSF	obliged,	and	were	given	full	access	to	all	camps.		
	
This	gives	the	impression	that	resource	investments	were	used	to	obtain	access.	However,	
according	to	the	report,	there	was	no	formal	negotiation	whereby	access	was	promised	in	
return	for	the	investment	of	human	resources.	More	importantly,	local	authorities	gave	
access	in	defiance	of	the	national	government’s	orders.	The	access	appears	to	have	been	a	
response	by	locals	to	the	immediate	need	of	the	IDPs,	rather	than	a	concession	made	by	the	
government	in	response	to	the	MSF’s	investment	of	human	resources.		
	
While	the	fact	remains	that	the	investment	of	staff	and	the	change	in	access	coincided,	
process	tracing	is	ultimately	a	search	for	causal	mechanisms.	The	two	examples	above	show	
a	correlation	between	the	investment	of	resources	and	the	obtainment	of	access,	but	in	
neither	example	can	it	be	said	that	the	investment	caused	the	change	in	access.	In	the	first	
example,	the	investment	could	not	be	said	to	play	a	causal	role	because	it	was	preceded	by	
the	change	in	access.	In	the	second	example,	the	investment	could	not	be	said	to	play	a	
causal	role	because	that	role	was	played	by	the	dire	circumstances.	It	must	therefore	be	
concluded	that	explanation	(b)	did	not	pass	the	doubly	decisive	test,	and	that	explanation	
(a)	cannot	be	excluded	in	that	way.	No	evidence	can	be	found	of	the	use	of	hard	power	in	
negotiations,	leaving	only	the	use	of	soft	power.	More	evidence	in	favour	of	this	hypothesis	
will	be	analysed	when	testing	hypotheses	4	and	5.		
	
Hypothesis	3:		If	the	HNGO	seeks	cooperation	with	states	and/or	IGOs,	then	it	is	based	on	
a	need	for	resources,	not	status	
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In	section	one	it	was	argued	that	NGOs	have	become	a	third	major	player	on	the	
international	political	stage,	in	addition	to	states	and	IGOs.	It	is	true	that	they	do	not	
possess	the	resources	of	states	and	IGOs.	However,	their	legal	status,	in	particular	with	the	
UN,	as	partners	of,	rather	than	consultants	to	ECOSOC,	meant	that	NGOs	were	able	to	
influence	negotiations	even	when	the	participating	states	opposed	it.	This	inspired	the	third	
hypothesis,	namely	that	whilst	HNGOs	may	cooperate	with	states	and	IGOs	based	on	a	need	
for	resources,	they	would	not	do	so	because	they	needed	them	for	their	status,	in	order	to	
gain	access.		
	
To	test	this	hypothesis,	two	explanations	can	be	formulated	for	the	HNGO’s	decision	to	
cooperate	with	an	IGO.	Conforming	to	the	hypothesis,	explanation	(a)	holds	that	the	
decision	to	cooperate	with	an	IGO	was	based	on	a	need	for	resources.	The	opposing	
explanation	(b)	holds	that	the	decision	to	cooperate	with	a	state	or	IGO	was	based	on	the	
need	for	status.	By	extension,	this	need	for	status	is	a	need	for	access.	In	other	words,	
explanation	(b)	implies	that	the	decision	to	cooperate	with	a	state	or	IGO	is	made	because	
the	HNGO	itself	did	not	have	enough	status	to	achieve	its	goal:	humanitarian	access.		
	
Explanation	(b)	will	be	subjected	to	a	doubly	decisive	test.	If	it	passes,	explanation	(a)	is	
necessarily	rejected,	along	with	the	third	hypothesis.	
	
In	fact,	there	are	two	occasions	on	which	the	MSF	approached	a	state	or	IGO,	asking	them	
to	use	their	status	to	negotiate	access.	In	October	2006,	the	MSF	‘turned	to	the	UN’	which	
‘endeavoured	to	negotiate	a	procedure	with	the	government’	and	eventually	‘obtained	
authorisation	for	access	from	the	Ministry	of	Defence	for	twenty-one	NGOs,	one	of	which	
was	MSF.’94	
	
Later,	in	late	2008,	after	the	government	had	expelled	all	NGOs	from	the	Wanni	(the	
frontline	of	the	violence	at	the	time),	the	MSF	ask	the	‘Indian	and	western	embassies’	to	
‘pressure	the	authorities’.	In	other	words,	it	asked	them	to	use	their	status	to	negotiate	
access	on	the	MSF’s	behalf.		
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The	requests	to	the	UN	and	western	states,	show	that	the	MSF	was	convinced	that	these	
entities	could	negotiate	more	successfully	than	them,	not	because	they	had	more	resources	
(IE	they	did	not	expect	them	to	buy	access	for	them),	but	because	the	government	would	
feel	a	stronger	obligation	to	fulfil	requests	from	those	sources,	due	to	their	standing	in	the	
international	political	arena.	The	hypothesis	that	HNGO	status	has	evolved	to	the	point	
where	they	are	no	longer	in	need	of	borrowed	status,	and	that	any	cooperation	with	states	
and	IGOs	will	therefore	be	based	solely	on	a	need	for	resources,	is	therefore	false.	The	truth	
is	that	whilst	the	status	of	NGOs	may	have	grown	significantly	over	the	past	fifty	years,	they	
are	not	a	third	major	player	on	the	same	level	as	states	and	IGOs.		
	
Hypothesis	4:	If	a	HNGO’s	expertise	and	legitimacy	are	recognised,	then	its	proposals	for	
intervention	will	be	accepted,	unless	its	proposals	are	perceived	by	the	state	as	a	threat	to	
its	sovereignty			
	
The	MSF	has	a	long	history	in	Sri	Lanka.	They	were	present	in	the	country	from	1986	until	
2003,	and	then	again	in	response	to	the	tsunami.	As	a	result,	they	themselves	‘felt	that	the	
organization	had	acquired	legitimacy	in	Sri	Lanka.’95	They	believed	they	distinguished	
themselves	in	their	response	to	the	tsunami,	‘by	calling	a	halt	to	donations	three	days	after	
the	catastrophe,	explaining	that	reconstruction	was	the	responsibility	of	the	state	and	that	
most	emergency	needs	were	already	covered	by	the	authorities	and	civil	society.’	They	felt	
that	this	response	had	‘flattered	national	Sri	Lankan	pride’,	but	from	the	beginning	of	its	
negotiations	over	access	in	2006,	they	‘soon	lost	their	illusions’	because	their	proposals	for	
intervention	were	rejected,	as	well	as	their	requests	for	access.96		
	
The	MSF	itself	here	concludes	that	its	lack	of	access	is	due	in	part	to	a	lack	of	legitimacy.	
Their	attempt	to	lead	by	example	during	the	tsunami	crisis	did	not,	in	their	view,	lead	to	
referent	or	legitimate	power.	This	seems	to	be	an	overly	hasty	conclusion,	as	it	fails	to	pass	
a	simple	hoop	test.	Assuming	the	MSF	was	not	respected	as	a	legitimate	actor,	it	would	not	
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have	gained	access	later,	when	circumstances	became	too	dire	for	the	government	to	
handle.		
	
An	alternative	explanation	for	the	lack	of	access	is	that	there	was	an	interfering	factor	which	
prevented	the	government	from	giving	access,	despite	the	fact	that	it	recognized	the	
legitimacy	and	expertise	of	the	MSF.	This	factor	is	the	government’s	fear	of	monitoring	and	
criticism.	This	view	is	expressed	not	only	by	the	MSF,	but	by	several	others.	The	MSF	itself	
believed	much	of	its	discord	with	the	government	was	due	to	its	free	use	of	speech	when	it	
came	to	human	rights	violations,	and	the	UN	report	is	full	of	complaints	about	obstruction	
by	the	government	against	their	(and	other	NGOs’)	ability	to	monitor.97	The	UN	report	also	
clearly	states	that	‘UN	officials	said	they	did	not	want	to	prejudice	humanitarian	access	by	
criticizing	the	Government.’98	Ultiamtely,	the	government	appears	to	be	afraid	that	
international	monitoring	and	criticism	are	a	threat	to	its	sovereignty,	because	it	can	
potentially	lead	to	foreign	intervention.		
	
In	his	book	on	the	crisis	in	Sri	Lanka,	Asanga	Welikala	looks	at	the	government’s	(and	the	
LTTE’s)	behaviour	from	a	legal	perspective.99	Welikala	notes	that	the	government	and	LTTE	
‘have	been	less	than	solicitous	about	internationally	established	basic	norms	of	armed	
conflict’	and	that	‘any	attention	that	has	in	fact	been	paid	to	these	by	the	armed	
adversaries,	has	been	due	to	international	exposure	and	fear	of	censure.’100		
	
In	this	light,	the	government	has	viewed	(H)NGOs	and	the	UN	as	a	threat	to	its	ability	to	
carry	out	their	mission	without	international	interference.	A	lack	of	access	to	‘uncleared	
zones’	then	appears	to	have	less	to	do	with	legitimacy	and	expertise,	and	more	with	the	
government’s	fear	of	observers	that	might	report	their	findings	to	the	international	
community.			
																																																						
97	For	example:	United	Nations	(2012),	p.	8	[‘the	UN	perceived	the	Government	to	be	trying	to	
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independent	monitoring	access’],	p.	17	[the	relocation	(…)	reduced	the	potential	for	monitoring]	
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99	A.	Welikala	(2008),	A	State	of	Permanent	Crisis,	Constitutional	Government,	Fundamental	Rights	
and	States	of	Emergency	in	Sri	Lanka.	Centre	for	Policy	Alternatives,	Colombo.		
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This	line	of	reasoning	is	supported	by	the	fact	that	the	government	has	taken	various	
measures	which	enable	it	to	control	for	contingencies	related	to	HNGO	monitoring.	Welikala	
highlights	that	the	government’s	Human	Rights	Commission	(HRC),	in	charge	of	monitoring	
the	state’s	observance	of	humanitarian	law,	is	part	of	a	framework	which	does	not	formally	
recognize	civil	society	or	NGOs.	As	such,	observations	made	by	HNGOs,	of	violations	by	the	
state,	will	not	be	listened	to	by	the	HRC.	UN	observers	who	had	‘incontrovertible	evidence’	
of	the	killing	of	civilians,	noted	that	‘there	was	no	established	process	into	which	this	
testimony	could	usefully	be	fed.’101	
	
An	additional	sign	that	the	government’s	restrictions	on	access	were	possibly	motivated	by	
fear	of	HNGO	monitoring,	is	the	way	in	which	it	has	formulated	its	anti-terrorism	laws.	
Welikala	notes	that	the	‘overbroad	language	of	these	regulations	could	lend	themselves	to	
abuse	(…)	in	that	they	could	also	serve	to	curtail	legitimate	democratic	activity	and	
fundamental	freedoms,	dissent	and	the	autonomy	of	civil	society.’102	In	fact,	these	laws	
formed	the	foundation	of	the	expulsion	order	which	the	MSF	and	five	other	international	
NGOs	received	in	September	2006,	as	the	MSF	was	accused	of	carrying	out	‘clandestine	
activities’	for	the	LTTE	under	cover	of	post-tsunami	aid.103		
	
Another	hoop	test	can	strengthen	the	belief	that	it	was	the	fear	of	monitoring,	and	not	the	
lack	of	recognition,	which	was	decisive	for	the	lack	of	humanitarian	access	in	2006.	
Assuming	the	fear	of	monitoring	is	responsible,	one	would	expect	a	change	in	access	once	
the	fear	of	monitoring	is	removed.	In	fact,	in	2009,	when	disturbing	images	reached	the	
international	press,	the	government	completely	changed	its	stance	toward	HNGOs,	
including	the	MSF.	
	
In	other	words,	as	soon	as	the	truth	was	out	and	HNGOs	could	no	longer	tell	the	
international	community	anything	it	did	not	already	know,	the	fear	of	monitoring	
disappeared	and	proposals	for	intervention	were	accepted.	The	only	places	it	was	still	not	
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103	F.	Weissman	(2011),	p.	21	
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given	full	access	to	were	the	internment	camps.	This	changed	too,	however,	once	the	MSF	
signed	a	confidentiality	agreement,	and	they	were	given	full	access,	and	the	freedom	to	
implement	multiple	of	its	proposed	programs.104	Again,	this	shows	that	once	the	fear	of	
monitoring	is	removed	(in	this	case	by	the	confidentiality	agreement),	the	MSF’s	recognized	
legitimacy	and	expertise	give	them	the	power	to	propose	and	implement	humanitarian	
intervention.		
	
As	such,	it	can	be	inferred	with	considerable	credibility	that	the	MSFs	lack	of	access	in	the	
early	years	was	due	to	the	government’s	fear	of	its	potential	role	as	an	observer,	rather	than	
a	lack	of	recognition	of	the	MSF’s	expertise	and	legitimacy.	Once	the	fear	of	monitoring	had	
lost	relevance,	the	MSF	was	considered	a	legitimate	power	in	and	by	Sri	Lanka,	and	was	
made	a	close	partner	in	the	provision	of	humanitarian	aid.	
	
In	Conclusion…			
	
Process-tracing	has	made	it	clear	that	the	MSF’s	expertise	was	recognized,	prompting	the	
government	and	local	authorities	to	ask	for	their	aid	in	moments	when	they	could	no	longer	
cope	by	themselves,	and	entering	into	partnership	once	the	monitoring	fears	had	become	
irrelevant.	At	the	same	time,	the	fact	that	the	MSF	represents	an	international	community	
made	it	a	threat.	It	became	a	strength	and	a	weakness.		
	
In	the	early	stages	of	the	conflict,	when	the	fear	of	monitoring	was	high,	the	MSF’s	status	as	
an	international	network	of	experts	made	them	a	threat.	Any	observations	it	made	could	
spread	quickly	through	its	network	and	reach	the	international	press,	which	in	turn	could	
prompt	the	international	intervention	the	government	feared.		
	
However,	once	the	Pandora’s	box	on	violations	in	the	country	had	opened,	the	best	way	to	
prevent	international	intervention	was	to	allow	the	MSF	to	help,	and	to	give	them	access.	At	
this	point,	the	best	way	to	prevent	further	international	intervention	was	by	showing	the	
world	that	it	was	allowing	for	the	help	of	experts;	experts	which	the	international	
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community	recognizes.	As	such,	at	the	later	stages,	the	MSF’s	status	as	an	epistemic	
community	did	have	a	significant	and	positive	influence	on	negotiations	over	access.		
	
It	can	be	concluded	that	the	hypothesis	stands,	but	that	extra	emphasis	must	be	placed	on	
the	possible	interfering	factors,	which	are	numerous.	In	ideal	circumstances,	internationally	
recognised	expertise	and	legitimacy	lead	to	instant	access.	However,	in	many	other	
circumstances,	that	same	recognition	can	be	a	burden.		
Hypothesis	5:	If	an	HNGO	negotiates	a	change	in	information	management,	whereby	it		
negotiated	change	is	made	in	information	management,	it	will	always	be	accompanied	by	
a	change	in	humanitarian	access	to	a	conflict	zone.		
Information	power	and	public	relations	are	closely	related	when	it	comes	to	the	work	of	
HNGOs.	Together,	they	can	be	referred	to	as	information	management.	It	was	shown	earlier	
that	the	MSF	did	indeed	use	information	power	during	negotiations	over	access.	Its	decision	
to	(unsuccessfully)	pressure	the	government	by	exerting	media	pressure	passes	a	smoking	
gun	test.	It	is	also	clear	that	the	UN	believed	it	had	to	refrain	from	sharing	information	with	
the	international	community	in	order	to	maintain	access.105		
	
A	closer	look	at	more	pivotal	moments	during	the	negotiations,	in	which	a	sudden	change	in	
access	occurred,	will	shed	more	light	on	whether	or	not	information	management	played	an	
essential	and	causal	role,	both	in	gaining	a	seat	at	the	table,	and	in	gaining	or	losing	access.	
To	clarify,	that	role	will	be	deemed	essential	if	it	is	deemed	likely	that	the	outcome	would	
not	have	been	the	same	if	information	had	been	used	differently,	or	not	at	all.		
	
Moment	1:	30	September	2006	–	The	Expulsion	Order	
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The	first	moment	was	discussed	earlier	in	relation	to	information	power.	The	MSF	was	
denied	access	to	‘uncleared	areas’	and	kept	away	from	the	negotiation	table	at	which	only	
the	ICRC	and	some	UN	agencies	were	allowed.	The	MSF	responded	with	a	series	of	critical	
press	statements.	Soon	after,	in	September	2006,	the	MSF	received	an	expulsion	order.	
Several	explanations	can	be	developed	for	the	expulsion	order.		
	
Explanation	(a)	is	the	one	given	by	the	government,	namely	that	the	MSF	took	part	in	
‘clandestine	activities’	that	supported	the	LTTE	forces	under	the	veil	of	post-tsunami	aid.		
	
Explanation	(b)	is	that	given	by	the	MSF,	namely	that	disagreements	with	the	government	
‘masked	underlying	discord’,	in	particular	over	the	MSF’s	‘keen	use’	of	its	freedom	of	
speech,	and	that	the	expulsion	order	was	a	response	to	the	MSF’s	critical	press	statements.		
	
The	government	never	made	any	evidence	public	to	support	explanation	(a).	The	MSF	has	
always	been	open	about	working	in	LTTE-controlled	areas,	but	this	was	to	support	local	
hospitals	in	service	of	civilians,	not	to	be	a	dedicated	medical	team	for	LTTE	forces.	As	such,	
there	is	no	evidence	in	support	of	the	claim	that	the	MSF	was	aiding	and	abetting	a	terrorist	
organisation.	Keeping	with	the	method	of	process	tracing,	a	simple	hoop	test	will	suffice.	If	
the	government	truly	believed	in,	and	had	hard	evidence	for	the	claim	that	the	MSF	was	
aiding	a	terrorist	organisation,	it	would	never	allow	them	to	work	in	the	country	again.	
However,	a	week	later	and	immediately	after	a	meeting	between	the	president	and	the	CFA	
co-presidents,	the	expulsion	order	was	put	on	hold	and	negotiations	over	access	were	
resumed.		
	
Explanation	(b)	has	been	widely	discussed	and	tested.	There	is	ample	evidence	for	the	idea	
that	the	government	feared	having	observers	present,	and	that	this	motivated	them	to	keep	
vocal	organisations	like	the	MSF	away	from	‘uncleared	areas.’		
	
What	does	this	mean	for	the	hypothesis?	Accepting	explanation	(b)	supports	the	claim	that	
information	management	played	an	essential	role	during	a	pivotal	moment.	The	expulsion	
order	followed	on	the	MSF’s	open	criticism	of	the	government.	Had	the	MSF	refrained	from	
such	statements,	it	is	likely	that	it	would	not	have	received	the	expulsion	order.	This	belief	is	
	 64	
strengthened	by	the	fact	that	promises	to	stay	silent	would	later	be	rewarded	with	
increased	access.	All	in	all,	the	government’s	message	seems	to	be	clear:	talk	and	be	
expelled,	or	be	quiet	and	stay.		
	
Moment	2:	November	2006	–	Access	Granted		
	
The	second	pivotal	moment	came	in	November	2006,	when	the	MSF	was	given	access	to	
three	hospitals,	selected	by	the	government	(and	not	in	uncleared	areas).	What	changed?		
	
On	the	negotiation	that	took	place	leading	up	to	this	pivot,	the	MSF	states	that	it	‘stopped	
seeking	an	official	denial,	the	abandonment	of	the	investigation	and	a	public	statement	of	
support.’106	In	other	words,	it	allowed	the	government	to	push	its	own	narrative.	It	is	not	
explicitly	stated	that	the	MSF	promised	to	stay	quiet,	but	what	is	clear	is	that	it	signed	a	
Memorandum	of	Understanding	(MoU)	and	that	no	more	critical	press	statements	were	
made	after	this	meeting.		
	
In	this	case	‘information	management’	meant	refraining	from	critical	public	speech,	and	
enduring	the	government’s	damaging	narrative	without	retort.	In	return,	the	MSF	gained	
access.	The	role	of	information	management	was	essential	in	that	there	is	no	doubt	that	
access	would	have	been	given	if	the	MSF	had	continued	to	pursue	the	cleansing	of	its	name,	
either	by	demanding	a	statement	from	the	government,	or	making	its	own.		
	
Moment	3:	May	2009	–	The	Second	MoU	
	
The	final	moment	that	is	relevant	to	this	hypothesis	is	similar	to	the	previous	one.	After	a	
long	line	of	rejected	proposals,	the	MSF	managed	to	negotiate	approval	for	a	number	of	
large-scale	projects,	including	the	opening	of	a	surgical	field	hospital,	increased	access	to	a	
government	hospital	and	the	opening	of	a	post-operative	care	unit.		
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In	the	same	negotiation,	the	MSF	once	again	conceded,	this	time	explicitly,	its	control	over	
information.	In	return	for	the	access	it	had	gained,	it	would	commit	to	“strictly	maintain	the	
confidentiality	of	the	information	on	service	provision”	and	make	“no	comments	(…)	
without	the	consent	of	the	Ministry	of	Health	Secretary.”107		
	
Again,	this	passes	a	smoking	gun	test	for	a	direct	relationship	between	a	choice	made	in	
information	management	and	a	change	in	access.	This	pivotal	moment,	which	allowed	for	
large-scale	interventions	by	the	MSF	that	were	previously	made	impossible	by	the	
government,	emerged	directly	out	of	the	MSF’s	choice	to	concede	its	freedom	of	speech.		
	
In	Conclusion	
	
There	have	been	other	pivotal	moments	for	the	MSF	in	which	information	management	did	
not	play	an	essential	role,	some	of	which	were	discussed	earlier,	as	when	the	UN	negotiated	
access	on	its	behalf.	However,	the	three	examples	given	above	represent	180	degree	turns	
in	the	government’s	stance	toward	the	MSF,	both	positively	and	negatively,	all	three	of	
which	were	a	direct	response	to	choices	made	by	the	MSF	with	regard	to	expelling	or	
withholding	the	information	that	it	possessed.	Returning	to	the	essence	of	the	current	
method	of	process	tracing,	the	aim	is	to	open	the	black	box	of	causation	between	events	x	
and	y	–	to	identify	causal	mechanisms.	The	examples	given	above,	in	combination	with	the	
earlier	inferences	that	were	made,	show	how	information	power	and	public	relations	
caused	changes	in	humanitarian	access.		
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Section	Four	
Conclusions	
	
Findings		
	
This	thesis	asked	how	non-armed	HNGOs	can	gain	leverage	in	negotiations	over	access	with	
armed	state	actors.	The	goal	was	to	explore	what	types	of	power	a	HNGO	had	to	work	with,	
and	ultimately,	to	empower	those	who	negotiate	on	their	behalf.	In	a	broader	sense,	the	
research	was	to	be	an	illustration	of	the	way	in	which	the	study	of	international	negotiations	
can	contribute	to	IR	theory.			
	
In	section	one,	HNGOs	were	differentiated	from	other	actors.	A	theory	was	developed	on	
the	types	of	power	that	exist,	and	it	was	seen	how	a	HNGO	might	utilize	them.	Furthermore,	
the	status	of	HNGOs	within	the	international	political	arena	was	studied	to	see	how	this	
might	affect	their	negotiating	position.		
	
Finally,	this	understanding	of	the	power	and	status	of	HNGOs	was	used	to	formulated	five	
hypotheses	on	the	ways	in	which	their	power	and	status	would	manifest	in	negotiations.	
These	hypotheses	predicted	that	HNGOs	would	rely	solely	on	soft	power,	and	that	their	
legitimacy,	internationally	recognized	expertise	and	choices	with	regard	to	information	
management	would	be	essential	for	their	ability	to	negotiate	access.	It	was	also	added	that	
morality	would	be	of	no	particular	significance	in	these	negotiations.		
	
These	hypotheses	were	tested	against	the	case	of	the	MSFs	negotiations	with	the	Sri	Lankan	
government	during	the	peak	of	the	civil	war,	from	2005	until	2006.	Within	that	case,	it	was	
indeed	true	that	the	MSF	relied	solely	on	soft	power.	The	initial	lack	of	access	gave	the	
appearance	that	the	MSF’s	legitimacy	and	expertise	were	not	respected	as	predicted,	but	a	
deeper	analysis	showed	that	the	lack	of	access	was	actually	due	to	the	government’s	fears	
of	monitoring,	and	unrelated	to	(the	lack	of)	legitimate	and	expert	power.	Once	the	fear	of	
monitoring	became	irrelevant	it	would	be	confirmed	that	the	MSF	would	indeed	be	involved	
based	on	its	legitimacy	and	internationally	recognised	expertise.	Its	status,	theorized	to	be	
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similar	to	that	of	states	and	IGOs	to	the	point	that	it	would	not	have	to	borrow	status,	
turned	out	to	be	weaker	than	expected.	The	MSF	had	to	resort,	on	two	occasions,	to	asking	
states	and	IGOs	to	use	their	status	to	achieve	things	it	could	not	achieve	on	its	own.	
	
Above	all,	it	was	shown	that	the	choices	it	made	in	information	management	–	when	to	
expel	and	when	to	withhold	information	–	were	absolutely	essential	during	pivotal	
moments	in	the	negotiations.	Lastly,	it	was	shown	that	morality	indeed	played	no	significant	
role	in	negotiating	access,	except	perhaps	in	the	sense	that	the	MSF’s	morals	would	oblige	it	
to	be	vocal	on	human	rights	violations,	prompting	the	government	to	keep	them	away	from	
sensitive	locations.		
	
Empowerment…	
	
How	do	these	findings	empower	humanitarian	negotiations?	Firstly,	they	can	create	
awareness	amongst	practitioners	on	the	choices	that	can	be	made,	and	the	effects	they	
might	have.	The	events	in	Sri	Lanka	show	how	choices	in	information	management	–	to	
speak	out	through	the	press	–	can	have	disastrous	effects,	as	when	the	MSF	was	nearly	
expelled	from	the	country,	which	would	have	brought	an	end	to	their	mission	and	
prevented	them	from	providing	life-saving	aid	to	thousands	of	IDPs.	The	negotiation	
strategy	that	was	chosen	was	a	rash	one,	and	a	more	conscious	decision	might	be	made	in	
light	of	the	findings	of	this	thesis.		
	
It	should	also	be	noted	that	most	staff	that	is	present	on	the	front	lines	is	specialised	in	the	
provision	of	medical	aid,	either	from	a	logistical	or	medical	standpoint.	Very	few	have	
received	any	formal	training	in	negotiation.	As	such,	this	thesis	provides	a	framework	which	
allows	them	to	understand	the	different	types	of	power	that	they	possess	as	
representatives	of	an	international	HNGO,	and	the	ways	in	which	they	might	utilize	it.		
	
Most	of	all,	the	findings	that	were	made	ought	to	inform	the	allocation	of	resources.	The	
extraordinary	power	of	information	has	become	abundantly	clear.	Increased	investment	in	
the	gathering	of	information	could	therefore	have	a	positive	influence	on	one’s	ability	to	
negotiate	access.	An	organisation	like	the	MSF	might	consider	hiring	more	experts	that	are	
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specialised	in	conflict	and	stakeholder	research	and	analysis,	so	as	to	be	better	informed	of	
the	partiers	it	is	negotiating	with,	and	the	underlying	causes	of	the	conflict.	This,	in	turn,	will	
help	them	to	better	predict	how	other	parties	might	react	to	its	actions,	and	how	the	
conflict	might	evolve.	
	
The	case	also	shows	that,	though	a	case	might	be	made	for	the	increased	status	of	(H)NGOs,	
they	should	not	overestimate	themselves.	It	is	still	very	important	for	HNGOs	to	invest	in	its	
relationships	with	states	and	IGOs,	and	if	possible,	to	broaden	them.	The	MSF	was	limited	in	
its	ability	to	rally	diplomatic	pressure	when	Sri	Lanka	shifted	its	allegiance	toward	non-
western	states.	In	the	future,	it	would	be	helpful	for	the	MSF	to	establish	a	bond	with	a	
state	like	China,	so	that	it	can	utilize	this	bond	in	places	where	the	US	has	less	influence.		
	
Finally,	it	is	confirmed	that	legitimacy	and	internationally	recognised	expertise	are	indeed	
the	foundation	of	an	HNGOs	work.	Without	these,	parties	in	a	conflict	zone	have	no	
motivation	to	cooperate	and	give	access.	As	such,	HNGOs	should	move	to	protect	their	
reputation	at	all	times.		
	
Contributions	to	IR		
	
The	findings	above	form	ample	support	for	the	idea	that	perceived	weak	parties	can	be	
powerful	in	their	own	way.	Internationally	recognized	expertise,	information	power	and	
legitimacy	gained	through	past	success	are	forms	of	power	that	can	be	garnered	by	small	
states,	given	enough	time.	In	fact,	it	can	be	readily	seen	that	those	smaller	states	that	have	
chosen	a	particular	focus	were	highly	successful	in	doing	so,	becoming	soft	power	leaders	in	
their	own	respect.	What	seems	to	be	important,	just	as	it	is	for	an	HNGO,	is	to	pick	a	focus	
and	stick	to	it,	simply	because	such	organisations	are	limited	in	resources	and	should	not	
attempt	to	become	good	at	everything,	like	the	world’s	superpower	attempt	to	do.		
	
Examples	who	have	been	successful	in	this	approach	are	readily	available.	Norway,	a	
country	which	chose	several	decades	ago	to	become	a	beacon	for	conflict	resolution	
through	mediation,	is	now	respected	as	a	legitimate	authority	in	this	field.	It	has	given	it	the	
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power	to	broker	peace	agreements	across	the	globe.	Similarly,	the	Swiss	excel	in	finance,	
the	Dutch	in	water	management,	and	so	on.		
	
The	study	of	IN	takes	IR	theory	out	of	the	abstract	and	confronts	it	with	the	realities	on	the	
ground.	The	study	of	IN	connects	theory	and	practice.	This	is	best	illustrated	by	seeing	how	
the	findings	here	relate	back	to	the	overarching	IR	theories.	Firstly,	none	of	the	findings	here	
reject	the	idea	that	hard	power	matters.	Size	does	matter,	in	that	it	forces	‘weaker’	parties	
to	make	choices;	to	specialize.	In	other	words,	the	findings	show	that	hard	power	matters,	
but	that	there	is	more	to	the	story.	This	research	also	does	not	deny	that	power	relations	
can	be	socially	and	historically	constructed.	In	fact,	it	stresses	that	perception	is	key,	and	
that	is	constructed,	in	part,	by	each	party’s	history.		
	
Perception	is	Power	
	
This	brings	the	discussion	back	to	its	beginning:	the	definition	of	power.	Power	was	defined	
as	the	perceived	capacity	of	one	side	to	produce	an	intended	effect	on	another.	In	this	case,	
the	government	perceived	the	MSF’s	greatest	power	to	lie	in	its	ability	to	influence	the	
international	community,	and	the	possibility	that	this	might	lead	to	international	
intervention.	Fearing	the	use	of	this	power,	the	government	attempted	to	oppose	it	at	all	
times,	until	finally	it	was	overrun	by	IDPs	and	exposed	in	the	eyes	of	the	international	
community.	Only	at	that	point	were	the	MSF’s	legitimacy	and	expertise	recognized,	and	was	
the	organisation	given	the	access	it	was	seeking.		
	
In	that	sense,	to	discuss	‘the	score’,	expert	and	legitimate	power	lost	out	to	the	
government’s	power,	in	particular	its	ability	to	expel	the	MSF	at	any	moment.	However,	in	
another	sense	the	government’s	combination	of	powers:	its	legitimacy,	its	expertise	and	its	
history	of	leading	by	example	(referent	power),	are	exactly	what	makes	them	the	
internationally	recognized	group	of	experts	that	could	potentially	and	at	any	moment	
trigger	international	intervention,	which	is	what	the	government	feared	the	most.		
	
When	the	UN	was	forced	to	leave	the	Wanni	(the	last	battleground)	against	its	will,	because	
the	government	announced	it	would	be	shelling	this	area	filled	with	civilians,	it	decided	to	
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stay	quiet.	‘Despite	major	concerns	expressed	by	some	UN	staff	outside	Sri	Lanka,	the	UN	
never	presented	the	full	circumstances	of	the	relocation	to	Member	States	or	the	general	
public.’108	They	themselves	recognized	that	the	expectation	that	the	UN	would	not	confront	
it	[the	government,	ed.]	on	the	issue	may,	in	turn,	have	influenced	Government	action.’109	
Simultaneously,	the	MSF	was	bullied	into	signing	a	confidentiality	agreement	so	as	to	get	
the	access	to	internment	camps	it	so	desperately	needed.	Both	the	MSF	and	the	UN	were	
perceived	as	strong	in	their	ability	to	sway	international	public	opinion,	but	weak	in	their	
willingness	to	stay	silent	in	return	for	limited	access.		
	
This	is	the	ultimate	proof	that	perception	is	power.	When	the	government	perceived	them	
as	threats,	it	opposed	them	with	all	its	might,	with	threats	of	expulsion	and	even	violence.	
When	it	found	out	it	could	successfully	manipulate	them	into	silence,	it	no	longer	opposed	
them	with	threats,	and	found	it	could	simply	tell	them	where	to	go,	and	where	not	to	go.		
	
It	is	like	the	game	of	chicken,	where	two	cars	run	at	one	another,	and	the	first	to	swerve	out	
of	the	way	loses.		
	
‘If	you	do	not	swerve,	I	will	expel	you	from	the	country’,	said	the	government.		
	
And	the	MSF,	and	the	UN,	swerved.	They	bent	to	their	will.		
	
What	if,	instead,	they	had	said:		
	
‘If	you	do	not	swerve,	we	will	expose	you…’?		
	
One	cannot	know	what	the	consequences	would	have	been,	and	if	this	would	have	been	
better	than	the	actual	course	of	history.	It	is	true	that,	once	the	government	was	finally	
exposed,	it	changed	its	course.	It	gave	full	access	to	HNGOs	and	it	quickly	moved	to	relocate	
IDPs	out	of	the	dreadful	internment	camps.		The	criticism	on	the	UN	and	the	MSF	has	
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therefore	been	that	they	should	have	exposed	them	much	sooner;	that	they	should	not	
have	swerved.	On	the	other	hand,	and	in	their	defence,	that	choice	would	likely	have	led	to	
their	expulsion,	and	it	cannot	be	known	how	many	atrocities	would	have	been	committed	
before	the	international	community	would	finally	have	stepped	in.		
	
It	is	therefore	not	useful	to	judge	these	organisations	for	the	choices	they	made	in	what	can	
rightfully	be	called	devilish	dilemmas.	However,	it	can	be	observed	that	these	organisations	
had	more	power	than	they	thought,	even	against	an	armed	adversary	on	their	territory.	In	
the	future,	this	might	empower	them	to	make	others	swerve.			
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